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INTRODUCTION
This is a case in which agents of the losing party in an unlawful detainer action
sued the winning party and its attorneys for more than five million dollars
($5,000,000.00) simply because the attorneys did their jobs and effectively protected their
client's interests in accordance with the law.

What grievous sin did the attorney

Defendants commit to warrant such a massive claim? They recorded two lis pendens on
behalf of their client Parkside, which remained in effect for a mere five months, truthfully
disclosing that Plaintiffs had pledged their houses as security for a property bond in the
unlawful detainer action. What do the Plaintiffs contend Defendants should have done
differently? They literally argue that prior to the recording of the lis pendens, Parkside
should have sued them in an entirely separate lawsuit seeking to foreclose on the houses
Plaintiffs had pledged as security. For thus depriving them of the right to be hauled into
court, Plaintiffs contend, Defendants deserve to have a multi-million-dollar judgment
entered against them.
The district court correctly nipped this lawsuit in the bud, dismissing the
Complaint in its entirety because Plaintiffs' own allegations demonstrate that Defendants
acted properly in all respects. This Court too should place its stamp of approval on the
attorney Defendants' thorough and professional legal services to their client by affirming
the district court's dismissal order.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-22(3)0) (2000).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Appellees offer the following statement of issues in lieu of that contained on pages
1 and 2 of Appellants' Opening Brief (hereinafter "Br. of Appellants"). This formulation
of the issues more accurately captures the arguments presented to the district court and
the basis for the court's decision below.
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Because this appeal challenges the district court's dismissal of this action under
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, all of the issues in this appeal are
legal issues to be reviewed for correctness, considering all Complaint allegations and
reasonable inferences to be drawn from them in a light most favorable to Appellants.
See, e.g., St. Benedicts' Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 196 (Utah 1991)
(setting forth standard of review for Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal).
ISSUE #1:
Did the district court correctly dismiss this action in its entirety because the lis
pendens upon which Plaintiffs based all of their claims were properly filed in an "action
affecting the title to real property," as permitted under the Utah lis pendens statute?
Defendants raised this issue before the district court both in their memoranda in
support of their motion to dismiss (R. 56-59; 245-52) and at oral argument on the motion.
(R. 306.)
ISSUE #2:
Should this Court affirm the district court's judgment of dismissal on the
alternative ground that the lis pendens upon which Plaintiffs based all of their claims are
absolutely privileged under Utah law?
Defendants raised this issue before the district court both in their memoranda in
support of their motion to dismiss (R. 60-62; 253-56) and at oral argument on the motion.
(R. 306.) The district court dismissed the Complaint without reaching this issue,1 but this
Court may nevertheless affirm on this ground because Defendants properly presented it to
the district court. Salt Lake County v. Bangerter, 928 P.2d 384, 386 (Utah 1996) (holding
that this Court may affirm a judgment below "on any ground available to the trial court,
even if it is one not relied on below") (quoting Harline v. Barker, 912 P.2d 433, 438
(Utah 1996)).
1

Contrary to the Brief of Appellants, the district court's memorandum decision
dismissing Plaintiffs' Complaint did not reach the absolute privilege issue. (R. 274-81.)
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ISSUE #3:
Should this Court affirm the district court's judgment of dismissal on the
alternative ground that each of the five claims set forth in Plaintiffs' Complaint
independently fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted?
Defendants raised this issue before the district court both in their memoranda in
support of their motion to dismiss (R. 62-66; 258-60) and at oral argument on the motion.
(R. 306.) The district court dismissed the Complaint without reaching this issue, but this
Court may nevertheless affirm on this ground because Defendants presented it to the
district court. Bangerter, 928 P.2d at 386.
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS ON APPEAL
In addition to the determinative provisions set forth in the Brief of Appellants (Br.
of Appellants at 2-3), the following statutory provision is of central importance in this
appeal:
Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-2. Scope.
(2) The provisions of this chapter [the Wrongful Lien Act] shall not
prevent a person from filing a lis pendens in accordance with Section 7840-2 or seeking any other relief permitted by law.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellees object to Appellants' Statement of the Case (Br. of Appellants at 4-6)
because it omits or glosses over several factors that are important to the outcome of this
appeal and because it contains certain erroneous assertions that materially distort the
record below. Most significantly, Appellants repeatedly intimate in their brief that the lis
pendens recorded on their houses were gratuitous and unnecessary because the tenant in
the underlying unlawful detainer action voluntarily satisfied the judgment against it. (Br.
of Appellants at 5, 7-8, 12.) The record is clear, however, that the tenant did not even
satisfy the principal component of the judgment until more than two months after the lis
pendens were recorded. Moreover, Defendant Parkside was forced to garnish the tenant's
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bank accounts to satisfy the interest, costs, and attorney's fees components of the
judgment, which garnishment did not occur until after Kasteler's and Daines' counsel had
prematurely demanded the removal of the lis pendens. Thus, the Brief of Appellants is
misleading in its suggestion that Defendants insisted on maintaining the lis pendens even
after the judgment had been satisfied.
Appellees offer the following Statement of the Case, which more thoroughly
describes the Complaint allegations and other materials that the district court considered.
A.

Proceedings Below.

On August 18, 1999, Plaintiffs G. Richard Kasteler ("Kasteler") and Mary L.
Daines ("Daines") filed a Complaint in the action below against Defendant Parkside Salt
Lake Corporation ("Parkside") and its attorneys—Defendants Greggory J. Savage
("Savage") and Matthew N. Evans ("Evans"). (R. 1-25.)2 The Complaint alleged claims
for "wrongful lien," "slander of title," "quiet title," "intentional infliction of emotional
distress," and "negligent infliction of emotional distress," based exclusively on two lis
pendens that Savage and Evans, on behalf of Parkside, filed and recorded on Plaintiffs'
houses on or about March 30, 1999 (the "Lis Pendens"). Id, In their prayer for relief,
Plaintiffs sought a judgment of "not less than" six thousand dollars ($6,000.00) in
damages under the "wrongful lien" statute, fifty thousand dollars ($50,000.00) in
compensatory damages, five million dollars ($5,000,000.00) in punitive damages, and
seventy-five thousand dollars ($75,000.00) in costs and attorney's fees. (R. 11-12.)
On September 9, 1999, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the Complaint
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, asking the district court to
dismiss the Complaint in its entirety for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted. (R. 41-43.) In support of their motion, Defendants argued that dismissal was

2

Plaintiffs also named Holme Roberts & Owen, the law firm where Savage and
Evans practice, as a Defendant below.
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warranted on three separate grounds:

(1) the Lis Pendens upon which the entire

Complaint was based were proper under Utah's lis pendens statute; (2) the Lis Pendens
were absolutely privileged under the judicial proceeding privilege; and (3) each claim for
relief was independently defective as a matter of law. (R. 47-144.)
On November 29, 1999, the district court heard oral argument on Defendants'
Motion To Dismiss Complaint. (R. 271-72, 306.)
On January 19, 2000, the district court issued a Memorandum Decision granting
Defendants' motion on the ground that the Lis Pendens at issue were properly recorded
under Utah's lis pendens statute and therefore could not subject Defendants to liability
under any legal theory. (R. 274-81.) A copy of the Memorandum Decision is attached
hereto as Addendum A. Because this holding disposed of the Complaint in its entirety,
the Court did not reach the additional, independent grounds for dismissal set forth in
Defendants' motion and supporting memorandum. (R. 280, Add. A at 7.)3
On February 7, 2000, the district court entered an Order and Final Judgment, a
copy of which is attached hereto as Addendum B, dismissing the action below in its
entirety. (R. 282-85.)
On March 8, 2000, Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Appeal to this Court. (R. 293-95.)
B.

Statement of Facts.

On July 17, 1998, Defendant Parkside filed an unlawful detainer action against its
commercial tenant Insure-Rite, Inc. (hereinafter the "Unlawful Detainer Action"),
alleging that Insure-Rite had unlawfully failed to vacate certain business premises owned

3

As noted above, contrary to assertions in the Brief of Appellants, the district
court did not reach the "absolute privilege" issue in its Memorandum Decision.
However, absolute privilege provides a valid alternative basis for the district court's
dismissal order, and the issue is therefore properly before this Court for consideration.
Bangerter, 928 P.2d at 386 (holding that this Court may affirm a judgment below "on any
ground available to the trial court, even if it is one not relied on below").
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by Parkside, which are located at 215 South State Street, Suite 401, Salt Lake City, Utah
84111-2354. (R.2-3at1[5.) 4
Defendants Savage and Evans, attorneys practicing in the law firm of Holme
Roberts & Owen ("HRO"; also a Defendant below), were counsel for Parkside in the
Unlawful Detainer Action. (R. 3 atffl[7-8.)
On August 13, 1998, the court in the Unlawful Detainer Action entered an order
requiring Insure-Rite to post a counter-possession bond in the form of a property bond,
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-8.5(2)(b), as security for the costs and actual
damages that Parkside would be entitled to recover if it prevailed in the Unlawful
Detainer Action. (R. 99-100.) A copy of this order is attached hereto as Addendum C.5
Insure-Rite was required to post such a bond in order to remain in possession of the
premises until the conclusion of the Unlawful Detainer Action. (Br. of Appellants at 4.)
Also on August 13, 1998, Plaintiffs Kasteler and Daines satisfied Insure-Rite's
security obligations by posting a "Renter's Counter Bond" on behalf of Insure-Rite with
the court in the Unlawful Detainer Action (R. 188-94), which bond pledged Kasteler's
and Daines' houses as security as follows:
This property bond represents security posted with the Court by the
Renter, Defendant, as the probable amount of costs of suit and actual
damages that may result to the Owner (Plaintiff) if Plaintiff [sic] has

4

Parkside filed the Unlawful Detainer Action, entitled Parkside Salt Lake
Corporation v. Insure-Rite, Inc., Civil No. 98 090 6982, in the Third Judicial District
Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. (R. 93-97.)
5

Because this order is an item of public record, it was appropriate for the district
court to consider it in connection with Defendants' motion to dismiss without converting
the motion to a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment. See Alvarez v. Galetka, 933 P.2d
987, 990 n.6 (Utah 1997) (noting that "items attached to pleadings, items of public record,
and items in trial record will not convert 12(b)(6) motion to rule 56 motion for summary
judgment") (citing 2A James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice f 12.07 (2d ed.
1996)). The same is true with respect to several other items of public record that the
parties presented without objection to the district court, many of which are attached
hereto as addenda. There is no contention to the contrary in the Brief of Appellants.
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improperly withheld possession of the premises located at: 215 SOUTH
STATE STREET SUITE 401, SALT LAKE CITY UTAH 84111-2354.
PROPERTY BOND
We the undersigned, G. Richard Kasteler, and Mary L. Daines, are
residents of Salt Lake and Davis County, respectively, State of Utah, and
we each own property in the State of Utah. We jointly and severally
undertake the obligation of this bond in the sum of $25,000.00, and we shall
pay all costs ana damages which may be awarded to the Owner, not
exceeding the sum undertaken. We state that each of us has a net worth,
above debts, more than the sum undertaken, and we pledge the property
listed herein as security in the above entitled action.
(R. 188-89, emphasis added.) A copy of this bond is attached hereto as Addendum D.
The parcels of property pledged in Kasteler's and Daines' Renter's Counter Bond were
Kasteler's house at 6278 South Granada Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah, and Daines' house
at 1210 Millbrook Way, Bountiful, Utah. (R. 190-91; Add. D at 3-4.)
On November 30, 1998, the court in the Unlawful Detainer Action granted partial
summary judgment in favor of Parkside on Parkside's principal claim—holding that
Insure-Rite was "in unlawful detainer of the premises leased from" Parkside—and
entered an Order of Restitution directing Insure-Rite promptly to vacate the leased
premises. (R. 110-13.)
On March 15, 1999, the court in the Unlawful Detainer Action entered an order
granting summary judgment in favor of Parkside on the issue of damages and ordering
Insure-Rite to pay Parkside a damage award of $108,417.24, plus interest, attorney's fees,
and costs. (R. 115-16.)
Approximately two weeks later, on or about March 30, 1999, Savage and Evans, in
their capacity as counsel for Parkside, and in an effort to protect Parkside's security for its
judgment against Insure-Rite, filed for recordation in the Salt Lake County Recorder's
Office two lis pendens (the "Lis Pendens") bearing the caption of the Unlawful Detainer
Action. (R. 3-4 atffl[9-10, 14-17, 20-23.) Copies of the two Lis Pendens (R. 14-17; 2023) are attached hereto as Addenda E and F. One of the Lis Pendens was recorded on
Kasteler's house, (R. 14-17; Add. E), and the other was recorded on Daines' house. (R.

366159.1

7

20-23; Add. F.) Except for the fact that the two Lis Pendens had different property
descriptions attached to them, they were identical to one another in form and content.
Each Lis Pendens stated in full as follows:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
You are hereby advised of the pendency of the above-entitled action
concerning title to certain real property situated in Salt Lake County, State
of Utah, that is more particularly described in Exhibit "A" attached hereto.
This is an unlawful detainer action. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-36-8.5 the Defendant Insure-Rite Inc. filed a counterpossession
property bond and filed as security for the property bond the property
described in Exhibit "A". On November 30, 1998, the Court determined
that Insure-Rite had improperly withheld possession of the leased premises
and has since awarded money damages in the amount of $108,417.24, plus
interest, attorney's fees and costs to the Plaintiff. Plaintiff therefore may
satisfy judgment through obtaining title to the property described in Exhibit
"A".
(R. 14-15, 20-21; Add. E at 1-2; Add. F at 1-2.)
Although HRO, on behalf of Parkside, could have immediately foreclosed on
Kasteler's and Daines' houses at that point to satisfy part of Parkside's judgment against
Insure-Rite, it instead elected to spare Kasteler and Daines that unpleasant experience and
sought to satisfy the judgment through other means. First, Parkside allowed Insure-Rite
time to make a voluntary payment. On or about June 4, 1999, over two months after the
recording of the Lis Pendens, Insure-Rite made a payment of $108,417.24 in satisfaction
of the principal amount of the judgment. (R. 118-20.) HRO, on behalf of Parkside, filed
a Partial Satisfaction of Judgment acknowledging that payment, but it expressly reserved
Parkside's "right to collect reasonable attorneys' fees, court costs and interest which the
Court ha[d] awarded to Parkside. . . ." (R. 119.) A copy of this Partial Satisfaction of
Judgment is attached hereto as Addendum G.
On August 17, 1999, despite the fact that Insure-Rite had satisfied only the
principal component of Parkside's judgment, counsel for Kasteler and Daines mailed a
letter to all of the Defendants demanding immediate removal of the Lis Pendens. (R. 206;
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Br. of Appellants at 5.)6 Savage replied to that letter on August 20, 1999, reminding
counsel that Kasteler and Daines had pledged their houses as security for the judgment
against Insure-Rite, that they had never requested the court in the Unlawful Detainer
Action to release their houses as security, and that the judgment remained unsatisfied. (R.
221; Br. of Appellants at Ex. 4.) Savage's letter closed by stating that the Lis Pendens
were proper and would not be removed, but it invited Kasteler's and Daines' counsel to
"address this matter to the Court" in the Unlawful Detainer Action if he disagreed. Id.7
Insure-Rite never voluntarily satisfied the interest, costs, or attorney's fees portions
of Parkside's judgment. Instead, Defendants were forced to garnish Insure-Rite's bank
accounts on June 30, 1999, to obtain additional funds for Parkside representing interest,
costs, and attorney's fees. (R. 122-25, 127-30.) Copies of these writs of garnishment are
attached hereto as Addenda H and I. Only on August 30, 1999 was Parkside able to
acknowledge full satisfaction by Insure-Rite of the court's judgment in the Unlawful
Detainer Action, including interest and all court-awarded attorney's fees and costs
incurred by Parkside up to and including April 30, 1999. (R. 132-34.)8

6

As stated above, the Brief of Appellants misleadingly suggests that Insure-Rite
had satisfied the judgment in full when Kasteler's and Daines' counsel demanded the
removal of the Lis Pendens. (Br. of Appellants at 5, 7-8, 12.) The record is clear,
however, that significant portions of the judgment remained unsatisfied at that time.
7

Although Plaintiffs make much of this correspondence in their Brief of
Appellants, (Br. of Appellants at 5-6), the record is clear that Plaintiffs never intended to
give Defendants a meaningful opportunity to respond to their counsel's August 17 letter
or to address the propriety of the Lis Pendens with the court in the Unlawful Detainer
Action. Plaintiffs' counsel sent the August 17 letter to Defendants by regular mail. (R.
206.) Accordingly, the letter was not received until August 19, and Savage was not able
to send his response until August 20. (R. 221; Br. of Appellants at Ex. 4.) By then,
however, Plaintiffs had already filed their Complaint in this case on August 18, 1999 (R.
1-25), only one day after their counsel had mailed the August 17 letter to Defendants.
8

Parkside again reserved its right to collect reasonable attorney's fees and costs
incurred after April 30, 1999. (R. 133.)
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Because Parkside had received payment for almost all of the total judgment in the
Unlawful Detainer Action, as described above, Savage and Evans Defendants filed
documents with the Salt Lake County Recorder on September 1, 1999, releasing the Lis
Pendens on Kasteler's and Daines' houses. (R. 136-39, 141-44.) Copies of these releases
are attached hereto as Addenda J and K.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This case is not, as Plaintiffs suggest, a complicated academic balancing act
involving the policies and common-law traditions of "[l]andlord-tenant law, surety law
and lien law." (Br. of Appellants at 7.) Nor does this case present the question of
whether landlords may employ "self-help" rather than valid legal process in unlawful
detainer cases. (Br. of Appellants at 8.) Rather, this case presents the simple question of
whether people who voluntarily encumber their houses with a property bond may assert
multi-million-dollar tort claims against the bond creditors and their lawyers merely for
informing potential home purchasers, through entirely truthful lis pendens, that the bond
exists.
The answer to this question, as the district court correctly concluded, is a
resounding no.9 It is certainly true that Kasteler and Daines would have encountered
difficulty had they attempted to sell their houses during the five-month period that the Lis
Pendens were in effect; in other words, Plaintiffs are correct that prospective purchasers
or lenders would be reluctant to "buy a pig in a poke" by acquiring a properly interest that
is subject in part to the outcome of a lawsuit. (Br. of Appellants at 8.) But that is exactly
the point of the property bond that Kasteler and Daines deliberately executed. They are
the ones who placed the "pig in the poke" and impaired the marketability of their houses

9

At no point in this lawsuit, either at the district court level or in their Brief of
Appellants, have Plaintiffs cited a single case in which any bond creditor has ever been
held liable on any legal theory for recording a lis pendens against property pledged as
security for the bond.
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by pledging them as security in the Unlawful Detainer Action. At the moment they
executed their "Renter's Counter Bond" (R. 188-94; Add. D), Kasteler and Daines
relinquished the right to sell or encumber their houses without giving priority to the bond.
Had they attempted to do so (and there is no allegation in the Complaint that they did),
they would have been in contempt of court in the Unlawful Detainer Action. The Lis
Pendens at issue in this case did not create that problem for Plaintiffs; Plaintiffs created it
for themselves. The Lis Pendens merely gave teeth to Plaintiffs' security obligations by
ensuring that no bona fide purchaser could impair Parkside's security if Kasteler and
Daines attempted to thumb their noses at the Unlawful Detainer court by selling their
houses out from under the bond.
Preventing such mischief is consistent with the best traditions of the lis pendens
doctrine, and there are multiple reasons why the district court was correct to halt
Plaintiffs' entire lawsuit in the starting gates. Defendants presented the district court with
numerous independent grounds for dismissing Plaintiffs' Complaint. Any one of these
grounds, standing alone, would require affirmance of the district court's dismissal order.
Together, they impose an insurmountable barrier to Plaintiffs' claims on appeal.
ISSUE #1:

First, the district court correctly dismissed Plaintiffs'

entire

Complaint because the Lis Pendens were proper under Utah's lis pendens statute.
Contrary to Plaintiffs' central argument, Defendants could have enforced Kasteler's and
Daines' property bond in the Unlawful Detainer Action itself, without having to sue them
in an independent enforcement action.

By filing their bond, Kasteler and Daines

essentially surrendered their houses to the jurisdiction of the court in the Unlawful
Detainer Action, which therefore had the power to enforce the bond without the necessity
of a separate action. Moreover, Kasteler and Daines made a general appearance in the
Unlawful Detainer Action when they filed their bond, thus empowering the court to
enforce the bond according to its terms.
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The Unlawful Detainer Action therefore

"affected title" to Kasteler's and Daines' houses within the meaning of the lis pendens
statute, and the Lis Pendens were proper.
Moreover, even if a separate enforcement action were required (which it was not),
the Unlawful Detainer Action still "affected title" to Kasteler's and Daines' homes. It
was the Unlawful Detainer Action alone that determined Kasteler's and Daines' liability
on their bond. Any subsequent enforcement action would have been nothing more than a
straightforward application of res judicata to which Kasteler and Daines would have had
no defenses. Because the Unlawful Detainer Action would have been utterly dispositive
in such an enforcement action, the Unlawful Detainer Action "affected title" to Kasteler's
and Daines' houses under Utah law even if a separate enforcement action were required.
The Lis Pendens were therefore proper, and Plaintiffs' lawsuit was correctly dismissed.
ISSUE #2:

Entirely apart from whether the Lis Pendens conformed to the

requirements of the statute, the dismissal of Plaintiffs' Complaint was correct because the
Lis Pendens are absolutely privileged under the judicial proceeding privilege. This Court,
like the courts of most jurisdictions, has held that lis pendens enjoy the protection of the
absolute judicial proceeding privilege. Contrary to Plaintiffs' argument, that rule of law
has not been supplanted or superseded in any way. Moreover, this Court has repeatedly
held that statements within the judicial proceeding privilege are absolutely privileged not
only against defamation claims, but against all claims of liability.

It was therefore

appropriate that the district court dismissed this action in its entirety.
ISSUE #3:

Finally, the district court's dismissal order was correct because each

individual claim in Plaintiffs' Complaint independently fails for a variety of reasons.
Plaintiffs' principal claim—their "wrongful lien" claim—fails for the fundamental reason
that lis pendens simply are not liens. It is well settled that lis pendens merely describe
encumbrances on property; they are not encumbrances themselves. Accordingly, the
wrongful lien statute expressly excludes lis pendens from the scope of its coverage. The
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"lien" at issue in this case is the property bond that Kasteler and Daines chose to execute;
it is not the Lis Pendens, which merely gave notice of the bond.
Plaintiffs' "slander of title" claim fails because the Lis Pendens were truthful in all
respects, and Plaintiffs do not contend otherwise. The claim also fails because Plaintiffs
have not alleged special damages in the form of a lost sales opportunity, as required to
state a claim for slander of title. Nor could Plaintiffs allege special damages. Any such
allegation would be an outright concession that Kasteler and Daines acted in contempt of
the Unlawful Detainer court by attempting to sell their houses out from under the bond.
Plaintiffs' remaining claims are similarly defective. The "quiet title" claim is moot
because Defendants released the Lis Pendens on September 1, 1999; the "intentional
infliction of emotional distress" claim fails because Defendants' alleged conduct is
insufficiently "outrageous" as a matter of law; and the "negligent infliction of emotional
distress" claim fails because it omits essential elements of such a claim.
Even when examined individually, none of Plaintiffs' legal theories states a valid
claim for relief. This provides yet another ground upon which this Court should affirm
the dismissal of Plaintiffs' Complaint.
ARGUMENT
I.

STANDARD OF REVIEW.
The propriety of the district court's dismissal of Plaintiffs' Complaint under Utah

R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is a question of law that this Court should review for correctness. See
Russell v. Standard Corp., 898 P.2d 263, 264 (Utah 1995); St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St.
Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 196 (Utah 1991). This Court should affirm the district
court's dismissal if the facts alleged in Plaintiffs' Complaint, when assumed to be true,
fail to provide any valid basis for the relief requested. Id. See also Whipple v. Am. Fork
Irrigation Co., 910 P.2d 1218, 1220 (Utah 1996) (stating that dismissal is justified "when
the allegations of the complaint clearly demonstrate that the plaintiff does not have a
claim"). When reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, this Court "recite[s] the facts in the
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light most favorable to the losing party below." Sperry v. Sperry, 1999 UT 101, U 2, 990
P.2d 381. In keeping with this standard, the foregoing Statement of Facts is drawn from
the face of Plaintiffs' Complaint and appropriate items of public record, with all doubts
resolved in Plaintiffs' favor.10
II.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED THIS ACTION IN
ITS ENTIRETY ON THE GROUND THAT THE LIS PENDENS AT ISSUE
WERE PROPER UNDER THE LIS PENDENS STATUTE AND CANNOT
SUBJECT DEFENDANTS TO LIABILITY.
All of Plaintiffs' claims fail in this case because each is premised upon an

act—Defendants' filing of the Lis Pendens—that Defendants were expressly permitted to
perform under Utah statute. Utah's lis pendens statute provides in pertinent part that:
In any action affecting the title to, or the right of possession of, real
property the plaintiff at the time of tiling the complaint or thereafter, and
the defendant at the time of filing his answer when affirmative relief is
claimed in such answer, or at any time afterward, may file for record . . . a
notice of the pendency of the action . . . .
Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-2 (1996) (emphasis added). In interpreting this statute, this
Court has broadly observed that "a notice of lis pendens may be filed with respect to
property whose title would be affected by pending judicial action." Boyce v. Boyce, 609
P.2d 928, 932 (Utah 1980) (emphasis added). The question of whether a lis pendens has
been properly filed is a question of law for the Court to decide. Timm v. Dewsnup, 921
P.2d 1381, 1392 (Utah 1996).11

Defendants recognize that this Court must, for the purpose of this appeal, accept
as true all factual allegations asserted in the Complaint. However, Defendants do not
stipulate to these facts for any other purpose, and if there are further proceedings in this
matter, Defendants fully reserve the right to present a factual defense and controvert the
Complaint allegations where appropriate.
11

Throughout the Brief of Appellants, Plaintiffs mistakenly discuss their
interpretation of the lis pendens statute only within the analytical framework of the
"wrongful lien" statute, which Plaintiffs erroneously contend requires lis pendens to be
"expressly authorized" by the "plain language" of the lis pendens statute in order to avoid
being categorized as wrongful liens. This faulty analytical approach is a red herring that
should not distract this Court. Because lis pendens simply are not liens, and are in fact
expressly excluded from the scope of the wrongful lien statute, Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-
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At the heart of this case is a procedural issue that Plaintiffs incorrectly believe
invalidates the Lis Pendens at issue in this case under the terms of the lis pendens statute.
Through what can best be described as a plea for this Court to exalt form over substance,
Plaintiffs surprisingly contend that Defendants tortiously violated their rights by failing to
file a lawsuit against them seeking to foreclose on their houses. Plaintiffs' argument, in
their own words, is that "the landlord first should have filed an independent enforcement
action against [Kasteler and Daines] on their bond as required by Utah statute and
common law, and only thereafter, could the landlord have recorded lis pendens on
Appellants' homes." (Br. of Appellants at 12 (emphasis in original).) That assertion is
quite clearly the "linchpin" of Plaintiffs' argument on appeal.12
All of Plaintiffs' claims arise from the Lis Pendens that Defendants recorded on
their houses. Yet Plaintiffs do not and cannot contend that their houses were entitled to
be free from lis pendens. They merely assert that Defendants made a procedural error by
failing to sue them prior to recording the Lis Pendens. In other words, Kasteler and
Daines literally argue as the basis for their multi-million-dollar lawsuit that Defendants
deprived them of their alleged right to be hauled into court in addition to having lis
pendens recorded on their houses. As they admit in their brief, "if the Appellees herein
had filed an action against the Appellants-sureties on their bond first, and thereafter
recorded the lis pendens involved, Appellants' lawsuit would not have resulted." (Br. of
Appellants at 30 (emphasis in original).)
2(2) (1997), it would be inappropriate for this Court to interpret the lis pendens statute
through the lens of the wrongful lien statute. Instead, this Court should simply interpret
and apply the lis pendens statute directly, as it always has. If the Lis Pendens at issue in
this case were proper under this Court's interpretation of the lis pendens statute, then they
certainly cannot constitute "wrongful liens" or support any of Plaintiffs' claims in this
case. Even Plaintiffs cannot seriously contend that lis pendens can be actionable as
wrongful liens despite satisfying the requirements of the lis pendens statute as properly
interpreted by this Court.
Plaintiffs emphasize the alleged requirement of an independent action no fewer
than eleven times in their brief. (Br. of Appellants at 5, 7-12, 24-25, 30.)
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Why do Plaintiffs believe this makes a difference? Because they concede that if
Utah law permitted Defendants to enforce Plaintiffs' property bond in the Unlawful
Detainer Action itself, rather than requiring an independent action on the bond, then the
Unlawful Detainer Action would "affect title" to Plaintiffs' houses and would justify
recording the Lis Pendens under Utah Code Ann. section 78-40-2, If the Lis Pendens
were proper under the statute, even Plaintiffs themselves acknowledge that their "lawsuit
would not have resulted." (Br. of Appellants at 30.) Plaintiffs argue, however, that an
independent action is required to enforce a tenant's counter bond because Utah's
possession-bond statute, Utah Code Ann. section 78-36-8.5(2)(b) (1996), does not
expressly state that an independent action is unnecessary. (Br. of Appellants at 24-25.) If
that "linchpin" proposition is incorrect, however, and a tenant's counter bond can be
enforced in an unlawful detainer action, then all of Plaintiffs' claims fail under the weight
of Plaintiffs' own arguments.13
A.

The Linchpin of Plaintiffs' Argument Fails Because Defendants Could
Have Enforced Plaintiffs' Surety Bonds in the Unlawful Detainer Action.

Contrary to Plaintiffs' argument, a tenant's counter bond can be enforced against
the sureties who post it in the very same action in which it is posted. The district court
correctly applied this rule of law as support for its dismissal order below, and Defendants
respectfully invite this Court's attention to the district court's carefully reasoned
Memorandum Decision. (R. 274-81; Add. A.)
The law does not require the cumbersome, inefficient waste of judicial resources
that would accompany the requirement of an independent action. In arguing otherwise,
Plaintiffs cite a handful of statutes and procedural rules addressing various types of bonds
and note that many of these statutes and rules expressly state that "[t]he surety's liability
13

The converse is not true. Even if an independent action were necessary to
enforce a tenant's counter bond, Plaintiffs' claims would still all fail as a matter of law for
the many reasons set forth below. This linchpin is critical to Plaintiffs' case only; not to
Defendants'.
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[on the bond] may be enforced on motion without the necessity of an independent
action." (Br. of Appellants at 24-25.) Plaintiffs argue that because these magic words are
not present in the possession-bond statute, the "default" rule strips the court of
jurisdiction over the sureties and requires an entirely separate lawsuit to enforce a tenant's
counter bond. Id.
What Plaintiffs fail to observe, however, is that the possession-bond statute
provides an even stronger jurisdictional basis for the court in an unlawful detainer action
to enforce a counter bond against the surety by requiring that "[t]he bond shall be payable
to the clerk of the court." Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-8.5 (2)(b) (1996) (emphasis added).
Rather than merely requiring sureties to submit personally to the jurisdiction of the court
for enforcement purposes, as other bond statutes and rules do, the possession-bond statute
goes one step further and ensures that the court will have jurisdiction to enforce a bond by
essentially requiring the sureties to surrender to the court any money or property pledged
as security. This unquestionably provides the court in the unlawful detainer action with
jurisdiction to enforce the bond against the surety immediately.14 If that were not the
case, it would be impossible for the court to order "immediate" execution on an unlawful
detainer judgment—a procedure that the unlawful detainer statutes expressly require. See

14

Rule 62 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure further supports the proposition
that requiring security to be deposited with the court is an alternative method by which a
court can acquire jurisdiction to enforce an undertaking. Rule 62(d) allows a party to
obtain a stay delaying execution on a money judgment pending appeal by "giving a
supersedeas bond." When such a bond is given, it must "provide that each surety submits
to the jurisdiction of the court . . . and that the surety's liability may be enforced on
motion and upon such notice as the court may require without the necessity of an
independent action." Utah R. Civ. P. 62(i)(4). As an alternative to requiring such a bond,
however, Rule 62 allows the court to "permit a deposit of money in court or other security
to be given in lieu of giving a supersedeas bond . . . ." Utah R. Civ. P. 62(i)(2). The rule
contains no language expressly granting the court jurisdiction to execute on security
deposited in court. As with the possession-bond statute, such language is unnecessary
because the court obviously has jurisdiction over property that has been relinquished to it
as security.
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Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-10(4) (1996) (requiring that "execution upon the [unlawful
detainer] judgment shall be issued immediately after the entry of the judgment. In all
cases, the judgment may be issued and enforced immediately.") (emphasis added). The
district court expressly adopted this line of reasoning (R. 274-81; Add. A), and Plaintiffs
have offered no explanation, other than ipse dixit assertions, of why it is incorrect.
The property bond that Kasteler and Daines posted in the Unlawful Detainer
Action satisfied the requirements of the possession-bond statute, and the bond could have
been enforced against them in that very action. The bond, which both Kasteler and
Daines signed, designated their houses as "security posted with the Court" in the
Unlawful Detainer Action. (R. 188; Add. D at 1 (emphasis added).) The bond contained
the caption of the Unlawful Detainer Action and was filed in the Unlawful Detainer
Action. Id. Thus, in accordance with the requirements of the possession-bond statute,
and through the unambiguous language of the bond itself, Kasteler and Daines essentially
surrendered their houses to the court in the Unlawful Detainer Action as security for their
undertaking to "pay all costs and damages which may be awarded to the Owner" in the
Unlawful Detainer Action up to the amount of $25,000. (R. 188-89; Add. D at 1-2.) By
thus voluntarily appearing and pledging 1heir houses as security in the Unlawful Detainer
Action, Kasteler and Daines submitted themselves and their houses to the jurisdiction of
the court, which could accordingly enforce the bond. No "independent enforcement
action" was necessary.
Indeed, under Utah case law, even if the language of the possession-bond statute
did not operate to subject Kasteler's and Daines' houses to the control of the court in the
Unlawful Detainer Action, their act of filing the bond in the Unlawful Detainer Action
nevertheless constituted a "general appearance" in that action sufficient to vest the court
with jurisdiction to enforce the bond. In Fitzgerald v. Critchfield, 744 P.2d 301 (Utah
App. 1987), the defendant obtained a discharge of a prejudgment attachment on certain
livestock by furnishing an attachment bond in the form of an undertaking by a surety as
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required by Utah R. Civ. P. 64C(g). Id. at 305. Contrary to the requirements of the rule,
the bond did not expressly provide that the surety submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the
court for the purpose of enforcing the bond. Id Nevertheless, following an order to show
cause hearing on the surety's failure to pay on the bond, the trial court ruled that the bond
was intended to guarantee any judgment against the defendant. IdL
The Court of Appeals in Fitzgerald concluded that although the bond did not
contain the precise language submitting the surety to the jurisdiction of the court, the
bond would nevertheless "be enforced according to the terms of the authorizing rule." Id.
More importantly, the appellate court stated as an alternative basis for affirming the trial
court that the surety had "made a general appearance at the show cause hearing, thereby
submitting itself to the court's jurisdiction to enforce payment on its undertaking." Id.
(emphasis added).15 Under Utah law, an appearance in court "for any purpose except a
special appearance to object to jurisdiction over [one's] person constitutes a general
appearance." Barber v. Calder, 522 P.2d 700, 702 n.4 (Utah 1974) (emphasis added).
Although the Fitzgerald court specifically held that the surety in question had made a
general appearance at a show cause hearing, courts from other jurisdictions have held that
the posting of a surety bond itself constitutes a general appearance. See, e.g., Hensley
et al. v. Minehan, 29 Ga. App. 251, 114 S.E. 647 (1922) (approving trial court's judgment
on a bond "against both principal and his surety" because "both [the principal] and his

Plaintiffs argue that the Fitzgerald case is inapposite because it involves Utah
Rule of Civil Procedure 64C, which expressly provides for the enforcement of bonds
without the necessity of independent actions. (Br. of Appellants at 23 n.5.) However, the
significance of the Fitzgerald decision in this case is not its analysis of Rule 64C, but
rather its alternative holding that the bond surety had made a general appearance. This
aspect of the Fitzgerald decision is directly on point in this case, and Plaintiffs have not
addressed it at all.
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surety have voluntarily appeared in the proceedings by filing a replevy bond for the
property levied on under the attachment").16
In light of the above authority, Kasteler and Daines entered a "general appearance"
in the Unlawful Detainer Action when they voluntarily signed and filed the property bond
with the court in that action.17 Under the Utah Court of Appeals' decision in Fitzgerald,
this general appearance gave the court jurisdiction to enforce the bond against Kasteler
and Daines in the Unlawful Detainer Action.18 Contrary to the "linchpin" of Plaintiffs'
argument in this case, the Unlawful Detainer Action did "affect title" to Kasteler's and
Daines' houses, and the Lis Pendens recorded by Defendants were entirely proper under
the Utah statute. Therefore, Plaintiffs' claim that they were tortiously deprived of the

16

See also Yale v. Nat'l Indem. Co., 602 F.2d 642, 645 ( 4 * Cir. 1979) (posting a
surety bond constitutes a "general appearance"); Ashmus v. Donohoe, 272 Wis. 234, 23637, 75 N.W.2d 303, 304-05 (1956) (filing of a surety bond "amounted to a general
appearance and gave the court jurisdiction for all purposes").
17

This distinguishes Kasteler's and Daines' situation from that of the injunction
bond surety in the Junction Irrigation case, which is the case cited by Plaintiffs as support
for the so-called "general rule" requiring an independent action. (Br. of Appellants at
24.) In Junction Irrigation, which has since been legislatively overruled, this Court held
that under the circumstances of the case, a party who had been wrongfully enjoined was
required to pursue an independent action to enforce an injunction bond posted by the
other party. Junction Irrigation Co. v. Snow, 118 P.2d 130, 131-32 (Utah 1941). In that
case, however, there was no indication that the surety on the injunction bond had itself
filed any document with the court or had otherwise appeared before the court in any
capacity. Kasteler and Daines, by contrast, signed and filed a document in the Unlawful
Detainer Action voluntarily submitting themselves and their houses to the jurisdiction of
the court.
18

Although the district court expressly adopted this line of reasoning and
concluded that Kasteler and Daines had entered a general appearance in the Unlawful
Detainer Action by filing their bond (R. 279-80; Add. A at 6-7), there is no mention of the
"general appearance" issue anywhere in the Brief of Appellants. This "general
appearance" analysis is an entirely independent basis for concluding that a separate
enforcement action was not required. Therefore, Plaintiffs have completely failed to
address an issue that is sufficient in and of itself to require affirmance of the district
court's dismissal order.
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privilege of being sued in an independent action has no basis in law and should be
rejected by this Court.
B.

Even if Defendants Should Have Filed an Independent Action To Enforce
the Bonds, the Unlawful Detainer Action Still "Affected Title" to Plaintiffs'
Houses, and the Lis Pendens Were Therefore Proper.

The Lis Pendens at issue in this case were proper under Utah's lis pendens statute
even if independent actions are necessary to enforce counter bonds under the unlawful
detainer statute. As noted above, this Court has held that under the lis pendens statute, "a
notice of lis pendens may be recorded with respect to property whose title would be
affected by pending judicial action." Boyce, 609 P.2d at 932 (emphasis added). By
pledging their houses as security in the Unlawful Detainer Action, Kasteler and Daines
unquestionably created a situation where title to their houses "would be affected" by that
action in a direct and palpable fashion, regardless of the technical necessity of an
independent enforcement action.
This is so because the outcome of the Unlawful Detainer Action would have
completely and irrefutably dictated the result of the enforcement action.19 The only
condition necessary to trigger Kasteler5s and Daines' liability on their bond was an award
of costs or damages in favor of the owner in the Unlawful Detainer Action. (R. 189; Add.
D at 2.) Once such a judgment was entered in the Unlawful Detainer Action, the die was
cast. That judgment would have been res judicata in any subsequent action to execute on
Kasteler's and Daines5 houses, and they would accordingly have had no defense in such
an action. Thus, the Unlawful Detainer Action plainly "affected title" to Kasteler's and

19

This is yet another reason why it would be an indefensible waste of resources to
require entirely separate lawsuits to enforce counter bonds filed in unlawful detainer
actions. Because the surety's liability on the bond is a foregone conclusion once the
unlawful detainer action has been litigated to final judgment, the only thing a separate
enforcement action would accomplish would be the unnecessary expenditure of additional
time and resources by the courts and the parties.
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Dames' houses within the meaning of the lis pendens statute. Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-2
(1996).
Plaintiffs seek to sidestep this unavoidable conclusion by asserting that the lis
pendens statute forbids the recording of lis pendens if an action's "effect" on title to real
property occurs anywhere outside the strict confines of the action itself.

(Br. of

Appellants at 19-21.) As Plaintiffs state their argument, the lis pendens statute "plainly
and closely ties 'the action' to 'the property' upon which the lis pendens is recorded. . . .
Nowhere in the Unlawful Detainer complaint (R. 98-97) is there any mention of the
homes of Appellants Mr. Kasteler and Ms. Daines, and the lis pendens therefore were
invalid." Id. at 19 (emphasis in original).20
This Court recently rejected such a narrow construction of the lis pendens statute
in the case of Timm v. Dewsnup, 921 P.2d 1381 (Utah 1996). Although Plaintiffs cite
Timm in their Brief of Appellants (Br. of Appellants at 19-20), the case in fact strongly
supports the proposition that an action can "affect title" to real property within the
meaning of Utah's lis pendens statute even if the effect will occur outside the strict
parameters of the action itself. In Timm, the defendants had borrowed money from the
plaintiffs and had pledged certain parcels of real property as security for the loan, one of
which—the "trust deed property"—was secured by a deed of trust. Id. at 1383-84. The
defendant borrowers defaulted on the loan, and the lenders filed a complaint against them
seeking to recover the unpaid balance of the loan. Id. at 1384. As part of the action, the

Far more glaring is Plaintiffs' omission from their Complaint in this action of
any mention of their property bond. (R. 1-24.) Nowhere in their Complaint do Plaintiffs
even hint that they had voluntarily pledged their houses as security in the Unlawful
Detainer Action long before the Defendants recorded the Lis Pendens at issue. Standing
by itself, the Complaint creates the impression that Kasteler and Daines had no
involvement of any kind in the Unlawful Detainer Action aind that Defendants
gratuitously recorded Lis Pendens on their houses for no reason at all. The best that can
be said of this omission by Plaintiffs is that it renders their Complaint extraordinarily
misleading.
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lenders sought to determine their respective rights and priorities with respect to some of
the property that the borrowers had pledged as security, but not the trust deed property.
Id. Instead of including the trust deed property as part of the action, the lenders intended
to conduct a separate non-judicial trust deed sale of the property. Id. The borrowers
responded by filing a lis pendens on the trust deed property that referred to the lenders'
action involving the loan default and the other pieces of property. Id. at 1392. On the
lenders' motion, the trial court released the borrowers' lis pendens. Id.
On appeal, this Court reversed. Like Plaintiffs in this case, the lenders in Timm
argued on appeal that title to the trust deed property "was not the subject of [their]
litigation" against the borrowers and that the court had therefore properly released the lis
pendens. Id at 1392. In response, the borrowers argued "that the trust deed property is
affected by the outcome of [the] litigation and therefore the lis pendens should not have
been released." Id. (emphasis added). This Court held for the borrowers, noting that
because their "interest in the trust deed property is subject to the outcome of [the] case,"
the trial court had erred in releasing the lis pendens, despite the fact that title to the trust
deed property would be affected in the context of a nonjudicial foreclosure sale. Id at
1393. Under the same reasoning, the Lis Pendens at issue in this case were proper
because title to Kasteler's and Daines' houses was "subject to the outcome" of the
Unlawful Detainer Action, even if the effect would technically be felt in a separate
enforcement action.21
This Court should not be misled by Plaintiffs' attempt to turn the Timm case to
their advantage by seizing on the irrelevant "amended counterclaim" issue. (Br. of
Appellants at 20.) The material factors in the Timm "action" are not complicated.
Simply put, lenders were seeking to recover money they claimed was due under
promissory notes. The borrower asserted that the promissory notes were paid in foil. The
resolution of whether the promissory notes had been paid in foil would determine whether
the lenders' planned nonjudicial foreclosure sale oi the borrowers' trust deed property
would be proper. That alone was the Court's stated basis for holding that the borrowers'
lis pendens on the trust deed property was appropriate: "If the trial court finds on remand
that [the borrowers] had paid the amounts owed on the promissory notes in foil, then the
lenders' [nonjudicial] foreclosure on the Dewsnups' property, including the trust deed
property, would be in error. Thus Mr. Dewsnup's interest in the trust deed property is
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Any other result would severely undermine the fundamental purpose of the lis
pendens doctrine and wreak havoc on the rights of litigants in unlawful detainer actions.
As this Court has observed:
The doctrine of lis pendens preserves the status quo by keeping the subject
of the lawsuit within the power and control of the court until judgment or
decree shall be entered. 1 he recording ot a lis pendens serves as a warning
to all persons that any rights or interests they may acquire in the interim are
subject to the judgment or decree.
Tuft v. Fed. Leasing, 657 P.2d 1300, 1302 (Utah 1982) (emphasis added) (quoting
Bagnall v. Suburbia Land Co., 579 P.2d 914, 916 (Utah 1978)).

This doctrine is

indispensable in preventing the temptation toward "mischief that would otherwise beset
parties to hotly contested litigation in which title to property is at issue:
The mischief that would follow if the parties to an action under such
circumstances could alienate away property which is before the court for
determination is obvious.
Tuft, 657 P.2d at 1302 (quoting Glynn v. Dubin, 369 P.2d 930, 931 (1962)).
Far from acknowledging the importance and applicability of these policies,
however, Plaintiffs literally argue in their Brief of Appellants that they were free to sell or
encumber their houses, destroying Parkside's security interest, and that there was nothing
any of the Defendants could do about it without subjecting themselves to a
$5,000,000.00+ lawsuit. As Plaintiffs put it, "[i]t is possible that sureties may attempt to

subject to the outcome of this case." 921 P.2d at 1393 (emphasis added). The fact that
the borrowers intended to file an amended counterclaim raising issues directly involving
title to the trust deed property simply was not part of the Court's analysis of this issue.
Also, Winters v. Schulman, 977 P.2d 1218 (Utah App. 1999), upon which
Plaintiffs rely heavily (Br. of Appellants at 19, 21), is readily distinguishable from this
case. In Winters, the defendant had recorded a lis pendens referring to a divorce action
that had been concluded by a final order seven years earlier. Id. at 1223. Moreover, the
lis pendens was recorded on property that the ex-husband had not acquired until a year
after the final divorce decree. Id. at 1220. In this case, by contrast, Defendants recorded
the Lis Pendens with respect to a pending unlawful detainer action in which the property
upon which the Lis Pendens were recorded had been expressly pledged as security.
Furthermore, to the extent that the Court of Appeals in Winters employed dicta
suggesting a stricter standard for assessing the propriety of lis pendens than the standard
employed by this Court in Timm, this Court's approach obviously takes precedence.
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alienate surety lands before landlords have an opportunity to file independent actions
against the sureties to enforce their obligations on Renters Counter-Bonds." (Br. of
Appellants at 25 n.6.) Yet Plaintiffs dismiss such appalling possibilities as unimportant,
casually asserting that it should be "left . . . to the Utah Legislature to make other
provisions." Id
This argument, like this entire lawsuit, demonstrates an amazingly cavalier attitude
by Plaintiffs toward the responsibilities they chose to assume as sureties in the Unlawful
Detainer Action. This is not, as Plaintiffs contend (Br. of Appellants at 21), a case in
which a party has improperly recorded a lis pendens merely because it ultimately intends
to satisfy a money judgment by executing on the opposing party's real property. See,
e.g., Busch v. Doyle, 141 B.R. 432, 436 (D. Utah 1992). Rather, it is case in which
Kasteler and Daines chose to act as sureties and voluntarily elected to place title to their
houses at issue by pledging them as security in the Unlawful Detainer Action.
What did Kasteler and Daines think they were doing when they made these
commitments to the court and Parkside in the Unlawful Detainer Action? How can they
argue with a straight face that they were immediately free to go out and sell or encumber
the very houses that they had just "posted with the Court" to satisfy a court order
requiring security to protect Parkside in the Unlawful Detainer Action? (R. 99-100, 18894; Add. C, D.) If such actions were permitted, property bonds in unlawful detainer
actions would be absolutely worthless.

The allegedly tortious Lis Pendens that

Defendants recorded in this case merely functioned to inform a universe of otherwise
bona-fide purchasers that any interest they acquired in Kasteler's and Daines' houses
would be subordinate to the property bond with which Kasteler and Daines had already
chosen to burden themselves. The only thing the Lis Pendens prevented Kasteler and
Daines from doing was selling or encumbering their houses out from under the property
bond—the very thing they had essentially promised they would not do when they pledged
the houses as security. Under these circumstances, the Defendant attorneys arguably
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would have committed malpractice if they had not filed the Lis Pendens on behalf of their
client. At very least, the Lis Pendens were proper under the Utah statute, and Plaintiffs'
claims were properly dismissed by the district court.
III.

APART FROM THE LIS PENDENS STATUTE, THE DISTRICT COURT'S
DISMISSAL OF THIS ACTION WAS CORRECT BECAUSE THE LIS
PENDENS AT ISSUE ARE ABSOLUTELY PRIVILEGED UNDER THE
JUDICIAL PROCEEDING PRIVILEGE.
Even if the Lis Pendens at issue in this case were technically improper under the

lis pendens statute (which they were not), the dismissal of Plaintiffs' Complaint was still
correct because this Court has expressly held that lis pendens filed in connection with
pending actions are absolutely privileged and cannot give rise to liability. In Hansen v.
Kohler, 550 P.2d 186 (Utah 1976), as part of a complicated dispute over a real estate
transaction, one party brought a "slander of title" action against another party based on
the latter's filing of lis pendens in an action that was pending between them. Id. at 189.
In remanding the case, this Court directed the district court to dismiss the slander of title
claim for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, id., reasoning as
follows:
The contention of Hansen is the recording of the lis pendens was privileged;
and, therefore, Pierce had no claim for slander of title. This contention is
well m a d e . . . . The sole purpose of recording a notice of lis pendens is to
give constructive notice of the pendency of the proceeding; its only
foundation is the action filed—it has no existence independent of it. . . .
[S]ince the effect of a lis pendens is to give constructive notice of all the
facts apparent on the face of the pleadings, the recordation of a notice of lis
pendens is, in effect, a republication of tne pleadings. Since the publication
of the pleadings is absolutely privileged, the republication thereof by
recording a notice of lis pendens is similarly privileged.... In the instant
action, Hansen's recordation of a lis pendens was absolutely privileged and
the action of Pierce for slander of title cannot be sustained.
Id. at 189-90 (emphasis added; citations omitted).
This Court's recognition in Hansen of an absolute privilege for lis pendens
recorded in connection with pending actions22 was merely a speciafeed application of the
The Hansen court distinguished an earlier Utah case—Birch v. Fuller, 337 P.2d
964 (1959)—in which there was no legal action pending at the time the lis pendens was
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"judicial proceeding privilege/' which creates an absolute privilege against liability for
any statements made in connection with judicial proceedings. Indeed, the Hansen court
cited to the very same provisions of the Restatement of Torts that establish the more
general judicial proceeding privilege:
The privilege stated in this section is based upon the public interest in
according to all men the utmost freedom of access to the courts of justice
lor the settlement of their private disputes. Like the privilege of an
attorney, it is absolute. It protects a party to a private litigation or a private
prosecutor m a criminal prosecution from liability for defamation
irrespective of his purpose in publishing the defamatory matter, of his belief
in its truth or even his knowledge of its falsity.
Id. at 190 (emphasis added) (quoting Restatement of Torts § 587 cmt. a).
This Court has long recognized that statements of attorneys, parties, judges,
witnesses, and other participants in the judicial process enjoy an absolute privilege
against defamation liability if made during a judicial proceeding. See, e.g., DeBry v.
Godbe, 1999 UT 111, f 10, 992 P.2d 979. The Court candidly recognizes that this
"privilege protects those who make otherwise defamatory statements from legal liability."
Price v. Armour, 949 P.2d 1251, 1256 (Utah 1997). "The policy behind such privilege is
to encourage full and candid participation in judicial proceedings by shielding the
participant from potential liability for defamation." Id. at 1256. The judicial proceeding
privilege "is premised on the assumption that the integrity of the judicial system requires
that there be free and open expression by all participants and that this will only occur if
they are not inhibited by the risk of subsequent defamation suits." Id. at 1256 (quoting
Allen v. Ortez, 802 P.2d 1307 (Utah 1990)).
In typical defamation cases, this Court has devised a three-part test to determine
whether a particular type of statement is entitled to the protection of the judicial

filed. 550 P.2d at 190. In such circumstances, lis pendens lose their absolute privilege.
Id. In this case, however, the Complaint allegations themselves establish that the
Unlawful Detainer Action was pending at the time Defendants filed the Lis Pendens at
issue. The absolute privilege is therefore fully applicable.
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proceeding privilege. DeBry, 1999 UT 111, ^ 11; Price, 949 P.2d at 1256.23 The Hansen
case essentially represents the Court's conclusion that as a category of "statements," lis
pendens recorded during pending actions satisfy any applicable tests, qualify for the
absolute judicial proceeding privilege, and cannot give rise to liability. This conclusion is
fatal to Plaintiffs' claims in this case.
Moreover, although Hansen appears to have involved only a "slander of title"
claim, the absolute privilege recognized by the Hansen court applies to all claims for
relief arising out of the privileged statements—in this case the Lis Pendens. See DeBry,
1999 UT 111 f 25 (concluding that "the judicial proceeding privilege extends not only to
defamation claims but to "all claims arising from the same statements'") (emphasis in
original) (quoting Price, 949 P.2d at 1258). For this reason, the absolute privilege bars all
five of Plaintiffs' claims—each of which arises out of the Lis Pendens. This privilege
provides an independent ground—wholly apart from the appropriateness of the Lis
Pendens, discussed above—upon which this Court can affirm the dismissal of Plaintiffs'
Complaint.
In an effort to avoid the clear applicability of the judicial proceeding privilege,
Plaintiffs have proposed an erroneous interpretation of Utah's "absolute privilege"
doctrine that renders the doctrine completely meaningless. (Br. of Appellants at 27-30.)
First, Plaintiffs assert that the absolute privilege accorded to lis pendens has been
"supplanted" to the extent it is inconsistent with the wrongful lien statute. Id. at 27-28.
In other words Plaintiffs appear to argue that a lis pendens is not entitled to the protection
of the privilege unless it complies with the law in all respects anyway.

23

"To establish the judicial proceeding privilege, the statements must be (1) cmade
during or in the course of a judicial proceeding'; (2) 'have some reference to the subject
matter of the proceeding'; and (3) be 'made by someone acting in the capacity of judge,
juror, witness, litigant, or counsel.'" DeBry, 1999 UT 111, ^ 11 (quoting Price, 949 P.2d
at 1256).
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Of course, it makes no sense for the law to afford a "privilege" to statements that
would not be actionable even in the absence of the privilege, and courts from other
jurisdictions have considered and expressly rejected Plaintiffs' argument. In Prappas v.
Meyerland Cmty. Improvement Ass'n, 795 S.W.2d 794 (Tex. Ct App. 1990), the plaintiff
made the very same argument that Plaintiffs make here: that the judicial proceeding
privilege does not apply to lis pendens that are filed in contravention of the applicable lis
pendens statute. The appellate court squarely rejected this contention, holding that the
existence of the privilege was not dependent upon whether or not the conduct was
"authorized" or "unauthorized" by the relevant statutory requirements. Id. at 798 (stating
that "[w]e cannot accept [plaintiffs5] distinction between 'authorized' and 'unauthorized'
[lis pendens] notices, turning as it does on technical compliance with the statute"). The
court stated that the proper remedy for a plaintiff harmed by an improperly filed lis
pendens is not a tort suit against the filer, but, rather, a request for a judicial order
removing the lis pendens. IcL at 797.24 The court used examples from other judicial
contexts to explain its holding:
For example, irrelevant evidence is inadmissible in a trial. [Rule 402].
Such evidence, when offered, is therefore subject to an order to strike it
from the record. Thus if a witness testifies, "Yes, the defendant is the man
who shot me, and by the way, he has a loathsome disease," the court should
sustain a timely objection, strike the slanderous remark, and instruct the
jury to disregard it. Yet no one would suppose for a moment that the
privilege evaporated simply because the comment was unauthorized. The
same result would occur it an impropriety surfaced in another part of civil
proceedings . . . , namely pleadings. For example, an amended pleading
would be "unauthorized" if it were filed late and without leave of court, see
Tex. R. Civ. P. 63, but one cannot conceive of such a defect making the
slightest difference as far as absolute privilege is concerned. Rather, the
remedy would be for the aggrieved party to ask the court to strike the
24

As noted above, in Defendant Savage's August 20 letter to Plaintiffs' counsel,
he invited Plaintiffs to address the propriety of the Lis Pendens with the court in the
Unlawful Detainer Action, stating, "If you disagree with this position, please let me know
and we will address this matter to the Court." (R. 221; Br. of Appellants at 5-6 and Ex.
4.) Plaintiffs never accepted this common-sense invitation to test the validity of the Lis
Pendens in the Unlawful Detainer Action, preferring instead to file a separate multimillion-dollar tort action against Defendants.

366159.1

29

offending papers. Although such a pleading, like irrelevant evidence, is not
authorized in the sense in which appellants employ that term, no loss of
privilege ensues.
Id. (emphasis added); see also Manders v. Manders, 897 F. Supp. 972, 976-78 (S.D.
Tex. 1995) (citing Prappas and granting summary judgment to a defendant where the
plaintiff alleged that the defendant had intentionally interfered with plaintiffs business
relations by allegedly maliciously and unlawfully filing a lis pendens).
Under this authority, the Lis Pendens at issue in this case enjoy the protection of
the absolute judicial proceeding privilege even if they were recorded in direct
contravention of the lis pendens statute (which they were not). Indeed, when this Court
extended the privilege to lis pendens in Hansen, it expressly acknowledged that the
privilege would protect lis pendens that were otherwise improper, shielding those who
record them from liability "irrespective of [their] purpose in publishing the defamatory
matter, of [their] belief in its truth or even [their] knowledge of its falsity." 550 P.2d at
190. If deliberate falsity does not strip lis pendens of the protection of the absolute
privilege, the privilege must certainly remain intact in the face of alleged technical
noncompliance with the lis pendens statute.
The only factor identified in the Hansen opinion that can operate to deprive a lis
pendens of the protection of the absolute privilege is if it is recorded when no lawsuit is
pending.

550 P.2d at 190. This exception is inapplicable in this case because the

Unlawful Detainer Action was pending at the time the Lis Pendens were recorded.
Plaintiffs nevertheless seek to take advantage of this exception by repeating their
erroneous argument that an "independent action" was allegedly necessary to enforce
Plaintiffs' bond. As a result, Plaintiffs again argue, the Unlawful Detainer Action did not
"affect title" to Plaintiffs' houses and the Lis Pendens were therefore "unsupported" by a
pending action. (Br. of Appellants at 23-30.)
This argument remains incorrect for all of the reasons discussed above in section II
of this brief. Even more importantly in the present context, this argument simply misses
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the point of the judicial proceeding privilege. In an unpublished 1991 decision involving
Utah law, the Tenth Circuit applied the absolute privilege doctrine to affirm the dismissal
of a slander of title claim based on the filing of a lis pendens by Utah County. Fitzgerald
v. Utah County, 931 F.2d 900, 1991 WL 70672 (10 th Cir. April 29, 1991) (attached
hereto as Addendum L.25 Utah County had recorded a lis pendens on land owned by the
Fitzgeralds that had been the subject of an unrecorded sale. IdL at **3. The lis pendens
referred to a lawsuit that Utah County had filed challenging similar unrecorded land sales,
but not the Fitzgeralds'. Despite the fact that the Fitzgeralds were not parties to the
lawsuit referenced in the lis pendens (and were in fact much further removed from that
lawsuit than Plaintiffs in this case were from the Unlawful Detainer Action), the Tenth
Circuit held that the absolute privilege doctrine set forth in Hansen v. Kohler barred their
slander of title claim:
Utah holds that the recording of a lis pendens is privileged and therefore
cannot support a claim for slander of title. See Hansen v. Kohler, 550 P.2d
186, 189-90 (Utah 1976). . . . The instant case is distinguishable from Birch
v Fuller, 9 Utah 2d 79, 337 P.2d 964 (1959), upon which the Fitzgeralds
rely, because in Birch no underlying action was filed. Here, as in Hansen,
an underlying lawsuit was filed. Although plaintiffs argue that Ftansen is
not controlling because they were not named in the suitf we conclude that
this fact is not significant. The decision in Hansen was based on the
Court's holding that a lis pendens is privileged because it merely
republishes the pleadings, whicn are themselves privileged. The lis pendens
here thus derives its privilege from the action it republishes. In Birch, to the
contrary, the lis pendens did not republish an underlying privileged
pleading.
Id. (emphasis added). This analysis applies just as strongly, if not more strongly, to the
Lis Pendens at issue in this case, which simply consisted of a fair republication of
absolutely privileged filings in the Unlawful Detainer Action. For this reason, the judicial

25

Defendants also presented a copy of the Fitzgerald case to the district court. (R.
264-67.) Although Fitzgerald is not binding precedent in this Court, both because it is a
federal court opinion and because it is unpublished, Defendants nevertheless offer the
case as a well-reasoned articulation of the legal principles they urge this Court to employ
in addressing virtually identical privilege issues.
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proceeding privilege shields the Lis Pendens from liability and provides an alternative
basis for affirming the district court's dismissal order.
IV.

APART FROM THE LIS PENDENS STATUTE AND THE ABSOLUTE
PRIVILEGE, THE DISTRICT COURT'S DISMISSAL OF THIS ACTION
WAS CORRECT BECAUSE EACH CLAIM IN THE COMPLAINT
INDEPENDENTLY FAILS TO STATE A VALID CLAIM FOR RELIEF.
Plaintiffs' arguments before both the district court and this Court have focused

almost exclusively on whether the Lis Pendens were statutorily permissible under the
terms of the lis pendens statute, Utah Code Ann. section 78-40-2. By focusing so
prominently on this issue rather than the actual elements of their claims for relief,
Plaintiffs appear to assume that if the Lis Pendens were improper under the statute, it
necessarily follows that they support Plaintiffs' tort claims against Defendants.
That assumption is unwarranted. Although the Lis Pendens certainly cannot be
actionable if they satisfied the terms of the lis pendens statute, the opposite is not
necessarily true. Even if the Lis Pendens were technically improper under the statute
(which they were not), and even if they were not absolutely privileged (which they were),
the Lis Pendens still do not, as matter of law, satisfy the essential elements of any of
Plaintiffs' individual claims for relief. Plaintiffs could and should have addressed any
alleged concerns they had regarding Defendants' compliance with the lis pendens statute
simply by asking the court in the Unlawful Detainer Action to release the Lis Pendens, as
Defendant Savage invited them to do. (R. 221; Br. of Appellants at 5-6 and Ex. 4.)
Indeed, almost all of the cases cited by Plaintiffs concerning the propriety of lis pendens
merely address the question of whether the court should release or remove the lis pendens
at issue. They do not involve tort claims based on the filing of lis pendens.26 A careful

26

See, e.g., Timm v. Dewsnup, 921 P.2d 1381, 1392-93 (Utah 1996) (holding that
trial court had erred in "releasing" lis pendens); Boyce v. Boyce, 609 P.2d 928, 932 (Utah
1980) (reviewing trial court's order to remove notice of lis pendens); Hamilton v. Smith,
808 F.2d 36, 37 (10 th Cir. 1986) (affirming trial court's injunction against filing notice of
lis pendens in action that did not affect the title to real property); Busch v. Doyle, 141

366159.1

32

analysis of the individual claims set forth in Plaintiffs' Complaint shows that none of
them states a valid claim 1 ipoi i w 1 licl 11 elief i na> be granted.
A.

Plaintiffs' "Wrongful Lien" Claim Fails Because Lis Pendens Are Not
Liens and Are Expressly Excluded From the Coverage of the Wrongful
Lien Statute.

Plaintiffs' "wrongful lien" claim, Complaint at 4-7, is based on Utah Code Ann. §§
38-9 1 t :> • 5 (199 7) and is fi n idai t lei itall> flaw ed foi a i i/i n :t lbei :>f i easons

I\

importantly, the wrongful lien claim fails for the simple reason that lis pendens are not
liens, under either statutory definitions or common law. Under the statutory definition, to
constitute a "wrongful lien," a document must
on an owner's interest in certain real property

. jate a lien or encui i i
?

Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-1 (19971

\

lis pendens simplv docs not imvt this statutory definition because it does not "encumber"
the property on which it is recorded.

Ji

merely provides record notice that pending

proceedings might affect title to the property. As this Court has observed, "[t]he sole
purpose of recordiiig a lis pei idei is is to give consti i icti \ e i lotice of the pendency of
proceedings which may be derogatory to an owner's title or right to possession." Hidden
Meadows Dev. Co. v. Mills, 590 P.2d 1244, 1248 (Utah 1979).

Courts from other

jurisdictions have expressly interpreted this distinction to mean tl ia.1: a lis pendens is not a.
lien. See, e.g., Dime Sav. Bank of New York v. Sandy Springs Assocs., Inc., 261 Ga.
485, 486, 405 S.E.2d 491, 493 (1991) ("A lis pendens is not a lien on the property

It

merely not ??-.-s prospecti v e pi n chasers that the property is involved in a lawsuit ")
(emphasis added; citations omitted); Chenich v. Chenich, 87 B.R. 101, 106 ( 9 t h Cir.
1988) ("[A] lis pendens is not a lien in the property or a vested right. It is merely a notice
of litigation which is dependent upon the outcome oftli.it dilution " (emphasis added)).

B.R. 432, 436 (D. Utah 1992) (granting motion for oi < ic :i: to i c lease lis pendei i 5 in ; i< ;ti< >n
that did not affect the title to real property).
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This case dramatically illustrates the difference between a lis pendens and a "lien
or encumbrance." The Lis Pendens at issue in this case did not "create" any encumbrance
of any kind on Plaintiffs' houses. They merely described, truthfully, a pending legal
proceeding that had the potential to result in the sale of Plaintiffs' houses to satisfy a
judgment. The "encumbrance" on Plaintiffs' houses was created by the property bond
that they themselves posted in the Unlawful Detainer Action pledging their houses as
security. The Lis Pendens simply identified that encumbrance; it did not create it.27
Thus, the Court should not be moved by Plaintiffs' cry that the Lis Pendens had the effect
of rendering their houses "unmarketable and unsuitable as security for a loan." (Br. of
Appellants at 16.) They should have expected as much when they pledged their houses as
security. And if they were attempting to sell the houses out from under the property
bond, then they are the ones who should be called upon to explain themselves in this
matter—not Defendants.
Moreover, lest there were any doubt that lis pendens do not create "liens or
encumbrances" within the meaning of the wrongful lien statute, Ihe statute contains a
"scope" section that expressly excludes lis pendens from the statute's coverage. "The
provisions of this [wrongful lien] chapter shall not prevent a person from filing a lis
pendens in accordance with Section 78-40-2

" Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-2(2) (1997)

(emphasis added). It is difficult to imagine how the wrongful lien statute could be more
clear in excluding lis pendens from its coverage.28

Another way to illustrate this distinction is to imagine that Savage and Evans
had simply recorded the property bond itself, rather than recording lis pendens describing
the bond. The effect on the marketability of Plaintiffs houses would have been exactly
the same because it was the bond that encumbered title to Plaintiffs' houses. The Lis
Pendens did not become "liens" merely because they were the means Defendants
employed to tell the world that Plaintiffs had encumbered their houses.
28

This statutory exclusion also underscores the basic proposition that lis pendens
are not liens.
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Plaintiffs respond to this argument by asserting that because this statutory
exclusion refers to lis pendens filed "in accordance v ith Section 78 4 0 - 2 " c A tl le I II ai i
Code, it should only apply to lis pendens that strictly satisfy the requirements of the lis
peiK lens stat ut<

( B i < >f \ ppellants at 18.) Plaintiffs' argument fails because it would

render the statutory exclusion in section 38-9-2(2) mere surplusage. The basic statuiti >r>
definition of "wrongful lien" already provides that the filing or recording of a document is
not "wrongful" if it is "expressly ai ithoi ized"b) an.) "state or federal statute." Utah Code
Ann. § 38-9-l(6)(a) (1997). Thus, lis pendens that comply perfectly with the lis pendens
statute are excluded from the definition of "wrongful lien" at the outset. For the express
statutory exclusion in section IX {)-2(?) lo luivi1 ,inv n liqxTiilnil signiikanu 1 ml iiiiisl be
interpreted to exclude all lis pendens that persons purport to file in accordance with the lis
pendens statute, even if they run afoul of the terms of that statute in some respect (which
the Lis Pendens in this case do not).
This is the appropriate interpretation under pertinent canons of statutory
consl ruction, "\ v hich provide tl lat com ts "are compelled to give the statutory language
meaning," should "assume that each term in the statute was used advisedly," and should
"avoid an interpretation which renders portions of, or words in, a statute superfluous or
in< >i >erati « < ; " Platts v. Parents Helping Parents, 94 7 P 2< I 658, 662 (Utah 1997) (citations
and internal quotation marks omitted). A statutory interpretation that "fails to give effect
to all parts of the statute

is contrary to [the Utah Supreme Court's] general rules of

statutoi > consti \ K tioi i " Bd. of Equalization v. State I a x C o m m n , -

l

o, i79

(Utah 1996) (holding that statutory "exemptions" must be construed so that each has
independent significance). Thus, to give effect to all statutory terms, this Court should

regardless of whether the lis pendens comply perfectly with the lis pendens statute.

366159.1

35

B.

Plaintiffs' "Slander of Title" Claim Fails Because the Lis Pendens Were
Truthful as a Matter of Law and Because Plaintiffs Failed To Allege Special
Damages.

Plaintiffs' "slander of title" claim is fatally defective for at least two critical
reasons. First, the claim fails because the Lis Pendens were not "false" as a matter of law.
The existence of a false statement is an essential element of a slander of title claim under
Utah law. Bass v. Planned Mgmt. Servs., 761 P.2d 566, 568 (Utah 1988). Courts from
various jurisdictions have affirmed the dismissal of slander of title complaints based on
lis pendens that accurately describe the proceedings to which they refer.

See, e.g.,

Ringier Am., Inc. v. Enviro-Technics, Ltd., 284 111. App. 3d 1102, 1106, 673 N.E.2d 444,
447 (1996) (1996) ("Because the lis pendens notice does no more than accurately inform
its reader of the existence of the counterclaim, it was in no sense 'false' and cannot form
the basis of liability."); Scott-Kinnear, Inc. v. Eberly & Meade, Inc., 879 P.2d 838, 840
(Okla. 1994) (affirming dismissal of slander of title claim based on lis pendens that
"fairly stated the issues of the lawsuit to which it related").29 In this case, a simply review
of the Lis Pendens shows that they fairly described the circumstances of the Unlawful
Detainer Action and were not "false." (R. 14-17,20-23; Add. E and F.)
Throughout this case, Plaintiffs have never even attempted to rebut this argument.
They completely ignored the argument at the district court level, and there is absolutely
no contention that the Lis Pendens were "false" anywhere in the Brief of Appellants.
Regardless of anything else, the absence of "falsity" in the Lis Pendens is fatal to
Plaintiffs' slander of title claim.
Moreover, the slander of title claim fails for the separate reason that Plaintiffs have
not adequately alleged special damages as required under Utah law. To recover for

29

Significantly, both of these courts also held that the respective slander of title
claims were properly dismissed because the lis pendens in question were absolutely
privileged, following the same line of reasoning employed by this Court in Hansen.
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slander of title, a plaintiff must, among other things, prove that he or she has suffered
"special damages":
There are no general or presumed damages in slander of title actions.
Special damages are ordinarily proved in a slander of title action by
evidence of a lost sale or the loss of some other pecuniary advantage.
Absent a specific monetary loss flowing from a slander affecting the
saleability or use of the property, there is no damaged
Bass, 761 P,2d at 568 (emphasis added). When special damages an; dawned, I.LN ivqwwvd
to state a claim for slander of title, they must be specifically stated in the complaint. Utah
R. Civ. r. y^g). A complaint that fails to allege special damages in connection with a
claim that requires a showing of special damages is subject to dismissal under I Jtali R
Civ. I\ 12(b)(6). See Allred v. Cook, 590 P.2d 318, 322 (Utah 1979) (affirming dismissal
of slander complaint that clain led no special damage). In this case, to satisfy the pleading
rules, Plaintiffs would have had to allege specifically in their Complaint that they tried to
sell their houses and failed because the Lis Pendens were on record. Plaintiffs, of course,

houses would be tantamount to admitting that were deliberately attempting to impair the
security that they had posted with the court in the Unlawful Detainer Action.

erroneous interpretation of the case law discussed above. (Br. of Appellants at 32-33.)
First, notwithstanding Defendants' assertion to the contrary, the Bass case does in fact
provide I hat " "special damages" ii i tl ic foi i n of a specific lost sale attribi itable to tl le
alleged slander must be proven to sustain a slander of title claim.

761 P.2d at 568.

Second, mere "notice pleading" is insufficient with respect to special damages. The Utah
Rules of Civil hoeetitue require special damages to be alleged specifically , arid slander
of title claims are subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) if that requirement is not met.
Finally, and directly contrary to Plaintiffs' assertion, the Bass case expressly states that a
claim for attorney's fees incurred to remove a cloud from a plaintiffs title is insufficient
to supply the required element of "special damages" if the plaintiff fails to allege and
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prove the loss of a specific sales opportunity. 761 P.2d at 569. Plaintiffs' slander of title
claim lacks the necessary element of special damages and fails as a matter of law.
C.

Plaintiffs' "Quiet Title" Claim Is Moot Because Defendants Have Released
the Lis Pendens.

The Lis Pendens were released on September 1, 1999 (R. 136-39, 141-44; Add. J,
K), and Plaintiffs' quiet title claim is therefore moot.

Plaintiffs' groundless and

speculative fear that "there is nothing to prevent Appellees from improperly re-filing" the
Lis Pendens in the future (Br. of Appellants at 33-34), is an insufficient reason to keep
this claim alive under the "capable of repetition yet evading judicial review" exception to
the mootness doctrine.30
D.

Plaintiffs' "Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress" Claim Fails
Because Defendants' Alleged Conduct Was Not "Outrageous" as a Matter
of Law.

Plaintiffs' "intentional infliction of emotional distress" ("IIED") claim fails as a
matter of law because the conduct alleged in the Complaint is insufficiently "outrageous"
to state a valid IIED claim. Among other things, a plaintiff asserting an IIED claim must
prove that the defendant engaged in conduct considered "outrageous and intolerable in
that it offends the generally accepted standards of decency and morality." Russell v.
Thomson Newspapers, Inc., 842 P.2d 896, 905 (Utah 1992) (citing Samms v. Eccles, 358
P.2d 344, 346-47 (Utah 1962)). Whether conduct is sufficiently outrageous to support
such a claim is a threshold question for the court to resolve as a matter of law. Keller v.
Ray, Quinney & Nebeker, 896 F. Supp. 1563, 1573 (D. Utah 1995) (granting summary
judgment where conduct alleged was not "outrageous and intolerable"), affd, 78 F.3d
597 (10 t h Cir. 1996); Sperber v. Galigher Ash Co., 747 P.2d 1025,1028 (Utah 1987).

30

Moreover, the Unlawful Detainer Action is over and on appeal, so there would
be no reason to re-file the Lis Pendens in any event.
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Under Utah law, courts have routinely held conduct far more extreme than
Defendants' filing ol llu: I is h ndi-ir In IN; msuffinentl \ uulra^eous to sustain i claim for
IIED. For example, in Keller, the court ruled that statements by the defendant threatening
to crush the plaintiff "like a peanut," "put him out of business," "take everything he
owned," and "follow Plaintiff'" his grave ' war insufficient!', otifiap^ir^ <o .upptji ,in
IIED claim as a matter of law. 896 F. Supp, at 1573
emplt v*^

t

In another case, threatening an

^crediting his reputation, and wrongfully removing him from an

important position ii i \ 'iolation of public policy were held, to be insufficiently outi •.

s

to satisfy the standards of Utah law. Boisjoly v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 795,
802 (D I Jt< ill 1988)

Defendants' filing of the I is Pendens at issue in this case pales in

comparison to such conduct, and Plaintiffs' IIED claim accordingly fails as a matter of
law.
E.

Plaintiffs' "Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress" Claim Fails Because
It Omits Essential Elements of That Cause of Action.

Finally, Plaintiffs' "negligent infliction of emotional distress" ("NIED") claim fails
as a matter of law because the Complaint allegations do not remotely satisfy the elements
of N I E D as recognized by tl lis Court. Reco\ ei ) foi 1 flED is permitted oi lb in iiai i c:n v
circumstances in which a plaintiff "was personally within the zone o f danger" created by
tht" defendant's negligence "and feared physical impact or peril due to the negligent acts
of the defendant. . . ." Hansen v. Sea Ray Boats, Inc., 830 P.2d 2MK 240 (I Hah

\W)

(emphasis added). See also Straub v. Fisher and Paykel Health Care, 1999 U T 102, f 8,
990 P.2d 384 (no recovery lor NIED "unless the plaintiff herself has been placed in actual
physical peril"); Lawson v. Salt Lake Trappers, Inc., 901 P 2d 1013. 1016 (I Itah 1995)
(holding that N I E D action "requires that the plaintiff feared physical injury or peril").
I'htititiffV Compliiml atlct?a(tiHis h i l to satisfy thestMfclrm<»n|s nf an NIED claim, and their
claim should accordingly be dismissed.
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In attempting to defend their NIED claim (Br. of Appellants at 34-35), Plaintiffs
cite exclusively to Handy v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 841 P.2d 1210, 1217-18 (Utah App.
1992). The Handy case, however, does not even involve Utah law. It is a Federal
Employer Liability Act ("FELA") case that happened to be tried in Utah state court, and
the formulation of NIED set forth in that case is taken from an opinion of a federal district
court in Massachusetts dealing with negligence in the FELA context. Moreover, even if
the NIED standard set forth in Handy were the correct legal standard, it would still
require an allegation that Plaintiffs suffered "physical harm manifested by objective
symptomatology."

Id. at 1217. Plaintiffs state in their Brief of Appellant that the

Complaint contains such an allegation (Br. of Appellants at 35), but that is simply not
true. The Complaint does not allege that Plaintiffs suffered "physical harm" as a result of
the Lis Pendens. (R. 10-11.) The NIED claim fails as a matter of law and was properly
dismissed.
CONCLUSION
The district court properly dismissed Plaintiffs' Complaint in its entirety because
the Lis Pendens at issue in this case complied in all respects with the lis pendens statute.
The district court's dismissal order was also correct because the Lis Pendens are
absolutely privileged and because each separate claim in Plaintiffs'

Complaint

independently fails as a matter of law. This Court should affirm the judgment below in
all respects.
DATED this 16 fay of November, 2000.

FRDO^WpltOBERTS
JAMES T. BLANCH
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on t h i s ^ — day of November, 2000,1 caused to be mailed by
first-class mail, postage prepaid, two true and correct copies ut Ihe fuuuoini, IWUV I 111'
APPELLEES to each of the following:
John Martinez
2974 East St. Mary's Circle
Salt Lake City, Utah 84108
Nick J. Colessides
466 South 400 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3325

366159.1

Tab A

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE ^DlWSP. 1 ^ COURT
Third Judicial District

G. RICHARD KASTELER and MARY L,
DAINES,

By^S^,

Plaintiffs,

Deputy Clerk

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Case No. 990908395

vs.

Honorable GLENN K. IWASAKI
GREGGORY J. SAVAGE, MATTHEW N.
EVANS, HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN, a
Utah Limited Partnership,
PARKSIDE SALT LAKE CORPORATION,
a Delaware corporation,

Court Clerk: Janet Banks
January 19, 2000

Defendants.

The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.
respect

to this motion

The Court heard oral argument with

on November

29, 1999.

Following

the

hearing, the matter was taken under advisement.
The

Court

having

now

considered

the

motions, memoranda,

exhibits attached thereto and for the good cause that has been
shown, hereby enters the following ruling.
BACKGROUND
This case centers around the procedures a landlord must use to
enforce
surety.

a tenant's

property

counter-bond

against

the

tenant's

Specifically, on July 17, 1998, defendant Parkside Salt

Lake Corporation ("Parkside"), filed an unlawful detainer action
against Insure-Rite, Inc. ("Insure-Rite") , alleging that InsureRite had unlawfully failed to vacate certain business premises

POO \
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owned by Parkside, which are located at 215 South State Street.

On

August 13, 1998, the court in the unlawful detainer action entered
an order requiring Insure-Rite to post a counter-possession bond in
the form of a property bond, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-368.5(2) (b),

as

security

for

Parkside would be entitled
unlawful detainer action.

the

costs

to recover

and

actual

damages

if it prevailed

that

in the

On that same day, G. Richard Kasteler

("Kasteler") and Mary L. Daines ("Daines")-the plaintiffs in the
present action-complied with the court's order in the unlawful
detainer action by posting a Renter's Counter-Bond on behalf of
Insure-Rite with the court in the unlawful detainer action.

This

bond pledged Kasteler's and Daines' homes as security.
On November

30, 1998, the court in the unlawful

detainer

action granted partial summary judgment in favor of Parkside on its
principal

claim and entered

an Order of Restitution

directing

Insure-Rite to promptly vacate the premises it had leased from
Parkside.

On March 15, 1999, the court in the unlawful detainer

action entered an order granting

summary judgment in favor of

Parkside on the issue of damages and ordering Insure-Rite to pay
Parkside a damage award of $108,417.24 plus interest, attorney's
fees, and costs.
On March 30, 1999, Greggory J. Savage ("Savage") and Matthew
N. Evans ("Evans"), of Holme Roberts & Owen, in their capacity as

002
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counsel for Parkside, filed for recordation in the Salt Lake County
Recorder's

Office

two

lis pendens bearing

the caption

of

the

Ultimately, the judgment was satisfied by other means.

On

unlawful detainer action.

September 1, 1999, Savage and Evans, on behalf of Parkside, filed
documents with the Salt Lake County Recorder releasing the Lis
Pendens on Kasteler's and Daines' houses.
On August 18, 1999, Kasteler and Daines filed this action
asserting claims for relief against al 1 defendants for wrongful
lien, slander of title, quiet title, intentional infliction of
emotional distress and negligent infliction of emotional distress.
ANALYSIS
In

support

complaint

of their motion, defendants

argue plaintiffs'

should be dismissed in its entirety because the lis

pendens out of which all of plaintiffs' claims arise are both
permitted

by

Utah's

privileged.

lis

pendens

Additionally,

it

is

statute

and

defendant's

are

absolutely

position

each

individual claim in plaintiffs' complaint suffers from specific
defects that cause it to fail as a matter of law.
Plaintiffs

oppose

the

motion

arguing

Utah

law

expressly

provides that the landlord must bring an independent action on the
renter's

counter-bond.

Furthermore,

assert

plaintiffs,

since

defendants did not properly file the lis pendens, such filings are

mr''7i;
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not protected by the judicial proceedings privilege.
to

the

claims

individually,

plaintiffs

contend

With respect
they

have

sufficiently pled all of the necessary elements to support their
causes of action.
AA

A rule 12(b) (6) motion to dismiss admits the facts alleged in

the complaint but challenges the plaintiff's right to relief based
on those facts."

St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp.,

811 P.2d 194, 196 (Utah 1991) quoting 61A Am. Jur. 2d Pleading §
227 (1981).

When ruling on a rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the

factual allegations in the complaint are accepted as true and all
reasonable inferences to be drawn from them are considered in a
light most favorable to the plaintiff.

Xd. quoting Colman v. Utah

State Land Board, 795 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1990); Lowe v. Sorenson
Research Co., 779 P.2d 668, 669 (Utah 1989).
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann § 78-40-2:
In any action affecting the title to, or the
right of possession of, real property the
plaintiff at the time of filing the complaint
or thereafter, and the defendant at the time
of filing his answer when affirmative relief
is claimed in such answer, or at any time
afterward, may file for record with the
recorder of the county in which the property
or some part thereof is situated a notice of
the pendency of the action, containing the
names of the parties, the object of the action
or defense, and a description of the property
in that county affected thereby. From the time
of filing such notice for record only shall a
purchaser or encumbrancer of the property
affected
thereby
be
deemed
to
have

00277
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constructive notice of the pendency of the
action, and only of its pendency against
parties designated by their real names.
Plaintiff contends that since the prior action did not affect title
to the houses posted
independent

action

be

as bond,
filed.

the aforementioned
However,

after

required

reviewing

an
the

applicable statutory and case law, such does not appear to be the
case.
As an initial matter, the possession-bond statute provides the
court in an unlawful detainer action jurisdiction by requiring that
"[t]he bond shall be payable to the clerk of the court." Utah Code
Ann. § 78-36-8.5(2)(b)

(1996).

Accordingly, rather than merely

requiring sureties to submit personally to the jurisdiction of the
court for enforcement purposes, the possession-bond statute ensures
that

the

court

will

have

jurisdiction

to

enforce

a bond

by

essentially requiring the sureties to surrender to the court any
money or property pledged as security.

Indeed, if this were not

the case, it would be impossible for the court to order "immediate"
execution oh an unlawful detainer judgment-a procedure that the
unlawful detainer statutes expressly require.

See Utah Code Ann.

§ 78-36-10(4) (1996)-1

1

Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-10(4) provides:
If the proceeding is for unlawful detainer
after default in the payment of the rent,
execution upon the judgment shall be issued

fl(V>7
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Furthermore, the property bond that Kasteler and Daines posted
in the unlawful detainer action satisfied the requirements of the
possession-bond

statute

and the bond

against them in that very action.

could have been

enforced

Indeed, the bond which Kasteler

and Daines signed designated their houses as "security posted with
the Court" in the unlawful detainer action.
caption

of the unlawful

unlawful

detainer

detainer

action.

It also contained the

action and was

Essentially,

filed

Kasteler

and

in the
Daines

surrendered their houses to the court in the unlawful detainer
action as security for their undertaking to "pay all costs and
damages which may be awarded to the Owner" in the unlawful detainer
action up to the amount of $25,000.
and

the pledging

By this voluntary appearance

of their houses as security

in the unlawful

detainer action, Kasteler and Daines submitted themselves and their
houses to the jurisdiction of the court, which could enforce the
bond.

Accordingly,

no

independent

enforcement

action

was

necessary.
This position is further supported by the case of Fitzgerald
v. Critchfield, 744 P.2d 301 (Utah App. Ct. 1987), where it was
questioned

whether

the

surety

had

submitted

itself

to

the

immediately after the entry of the judgment.
In all cases, the judgment may be issued and
enforced immediately.

nn?79
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jurisdiction of the court for purposes of enforcing the bond.

In

Fitzgerald, the Court of Appeals concluded that although the bond
did not contain the precise language submitting the surety to the
jurisdiction of the court, the bond would nevertheless "be enforced
according to the terms of the authorizing rule."

I_d. at 305.

Furthermore, the court stated that as an alternative basis, the
surety had made a general appearance at the show cause hearing,
thereby submitting itself to the court's jurisdiction to enforce
payment on its undertaking.

Id.

Based upon the forgoing, the Court concludes defendants were
not

required

counter-bond.

to bring

an

independent

action

on

the

renter's

Further, since all parties agreed a finding by this

Court that the lis pendens was proper under Utah's lis pendens
results in the failure of plaintiffs' claims against defendants,
the Court does not reach the merits of the plaintiffs' claims
individually.

Defendants' Motion to dismiss is well taken and

accordingly, granted.
DATED this / f

day of January, 2000
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Case No. 990908395
C e r t i f i c a t e of Mailing
I c e r t i f y t h a t on the 20th day of January, 2 000, 1 sent by
f i r s t c l a s s mail a t r u e and c o r r e c t copy of the a t t a c h e d document
t o the following:'
GORDON L. ROBERTS
JAMES T. BLANCH
201 SOUTH MAIN STREET, SUITE 1800
P.O. BOX 45898
SLC, UTAH 84145-0898
NICK J. COLESSIDES
466 SOUTH 400 EAST, SUITE 100
SLC, UTAH 84111-3325
JOHN MARTINEZ
2974 EAST ST MARY'S CIRCLE
SLC, UTAH 84108

D i s t r i c t Court Clerk

By:

^^QW\V^ ^
^"^Teputy Clerk

••Individuals with disabilities needing special accommodations during this
proceeding should call 238-7300, at least three working days prior to
the proceeding.
TDD phone for hearing impaired, 238-7391.
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FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

GORDON L. ROBERTS (2770)
JAMES T. BLANCH (6494)
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Defendants
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800
Post Office Box 45898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0898
Telephone: (801) 532-1234

- 7 2000

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, DIVISION I
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * *

G. RICHARD KASTELER and MARY L.
DAINES,
Plaintiffs,

ORDER AND FINAL JUDGMENT

vs.
Case No. 99 09 08395
GREGGORY J. SAVAGE, MATTHEW N.
EVANS, HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN, a
Utah Limited Liability Partnership,
PARKSIDE SALT LAKE CORPORATION,
a Delaware corporation,

Judge Glenn Iwasaki

Defendants.
* * * * * * *

316376 I
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On November 29, 1999, the Court heard oral argument on Defendants' Motion To
Dismiss Complaint in the above-captioned action. Defendants Greggory J. Savage, Matthew N.
Evans, Holme Roberts & Owen, and Parkside Salt Lake Corporation were represented by their
counsel, Gordon Roberts and James Blanch. Plaintiffs G. Richard Kasteler and Mary L. Daines
were represented by their counsel, Nick Colessides. On January 19, 2000, the Court, having
considered the written memoranda submitted by the parties, having reviewed the applicable legal
authorities, having heard the oral arguments of counsel, and being fully advised in the premises,
entered a Memorandum Decision ("Memorandum Decision") granting Defendants' Motion To
Dismiss Complaint in its entirety. Now, for the reasons set forth in said Memorandum Decision,
the Court hereby ORDERS, ADJUDGES and DECREES as follows:
1.

For the reasons set forth in the Court's Memorandum Decision, which is

incorporated herein by reference, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs Complaint fails to state a
claim against Defendants upon which relief can be granted for any of the claims asserted therein.
2.

Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court hereby

dismisses all claims asserted in Plaintiffs' Complaint with prejudice, with Plaintiffs to bear
Defendants' costs as provided in Utah R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1).
3.

This Order constitutes the Final Judgment of this Court on all claims asserted by

any party in this action. Therefore, the Court hereby dismisses this action in its entirety, with
prejudice.

316376.1
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IT IS SO ORDERED this /

day oT January; 2000.
BYTH

Honorable Glenn Iwasaki
Third District Court Judge
Approved as to form and substance:

Counsel for Plaintiffs
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this i f "day of January, 2000,1 caused to be hand-delivered a true
and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER AND FINAL JUDGMENT to the following:
Nick J. Colessides
Attorney at Law
466 South 400 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 -3325
John Martinez
Attorney at Law
2974 East St. Mary's Circle
Salt Lake City, Utah 84108
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NICK J. COLESSIDES (/ 696)
JOHN T. GIANNOPOULOS (# 7209)
Attorney at Law
466 South 400 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3325
Tele: (801) 521-4441
Attorneys for Defendant
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
PARKSIDE SALT LAKE CORP.
a Utah, corporation,
Plaintiff,

\

ORDER

• SETTING AMOUNT
]) FOR COUNTER POSSESSION BOND

vs.
INSURE-RITE, INC.,
a Utah corporation,
Defendant.

\

Case No. 98 090 6982

{

Judge: Stephen L. Henriod

Based upon Defendants Motion Setting Amount for Counter
Possession Bond, pursuant to § 78-36-8.5 (2) (b)

UTAH CODE ANNOTATED,

1953 as amended, 1996 Replacement, and good cause otherwise
appearing therefor
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, DECREED, AND ADJUDGED
that the amount of the Counter Possession Bond is hereby set at

\s
•> District Court Judge
C:\WPDOCS\I\in3urite v parkside.9.wpd

—. > - ..•
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MAI-LING CEKTI-FICATE
Mailed a copy of the foregoing Order Setting Amount of
Counter Possession Bond to:
MR ROBERT L STOLEBARGER ESQ
MR GREGORY J SAVAGE ESQ
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN
111 EAST BROADWAY, SUITE 1100
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111
via the United States Postal Service, postage prepaid, first
class mail, this /y*day of August, 1998.
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NICK J. COLESSIDES (# 696)
JOHN T. GIANNOPOULOS (# 7209)
Attorney at Law
466 South 400 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3325
Tele: (801) 521-4441
Attorneys for Defendant
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
PARKSIDE SALT LAKE CORP.
a Utah, corporation,

)

Plaintiff,
vs.
INSURE-RITE, INC*,
a Utah corporation,
Defendant.

•
]

RENTERS COUNTER BOND

]|

Case No. 98 090 6982

Judge: Stephen L. Henriod

This property bond represents security posted with the Court
by the Renter, Defendant, as the probable amount of costs of suit
and actual damages that may result to the Owner (Plaintiff) if
Plaintiff has improperly withheld possession of the premises
located at: 215 SOUTH STATE STREET SUITE 401, SALT LAKE CITY UTAH
84111-2354.
PROPERTY BOND
We the undersigned, G. Richard Kasteler, and Mary L. Daines,
are residents of Salt Lake and Davis County, respectively, State
of Utah, and we each own property in the property in the State of
C:\WPDOCS\I\msurite v p a r k s i d e . 7 .wpd

Utah.

We jointly and severally undertake the obligation of this

bond in the sum of $ 25,000*00, and we shall pay all costs and
damages which may be awarded to the Owner, not exceeding the sum
undertaken.

We state that each of us has a net worth, above

debts, more than the sum undertaken; and we pledge the property
listed herein as security in the above entitled action.

C:\WPDOCS\I\msurite v parkside. ~* .wpd
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SURETY NO,: 1
RENTER'S COUNTER BOND
Case No.: 98 09 06982
1.

Location of real property being pledged to execute this
bond: 1210 East Millbrook Way, Bountiful, Utah 84010.

2.

Names of any others that have an ownership interest in the
property: None

3.

Detailed description of the property: A house dwelling with
necessary appurtenant facilities; for legal description see
attached exhibit MAA\

4.

Liens presently against property: A sum not in excess of
$100,900.00.

5.

Fair market value of property: $383,000.00

6.

Total amount of outstanding bonds for which property is
presently being pledged as security: $ None, other than the
pledge for the within security.

Mary/L. Dames
1210 East Millbrook Way
Bountiful, Utah 84 010
Tele: 801.295-5072
STATE OF UTAH
ss

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

The f o r e g o i n g i n s t r u m e n t was /acknc rledged b e f o r e m^
t h i s 12 t h day of August, 1998, by Mary f > D a /
t h e signer^
hereof.
My Commission E x p i r e s :
FARY,

Salt

, Residu^g i n
e ^Count £,.. iitab. — ——-•
mmmm — — —

Notary

PgbliC

J

NICK J. COIESS1DES

I

466 South 400 East

|

Salt Lake City, Utah B4111 .
My Commission Expires J
February 23, 19D9
1
State of Utah
J
C:\WPDOCS\I\insurite v p a r k s i d e . ? -uroci

SURETY NO,: 2
RENTER'S COUNTER BOND
Case No.: 98 09 06982
1.

Location of real property being pledged to execute this
bond: 6278 South Granada Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah 84121.

2.

Names of any others that have an ownership interest in the
property: None

3.

Detailed description of the property: A house dwelling with
necessary appurtenant facilities, located in Salt Lake
County, Utah; for legal description see attached exhibit
"BB\

4.

Liens presently against property: A sum not in excess of
$198,000.00

5.

Fair market value of property: $275,000.00

6.

Total amount of outstanding bonds for which property is
presently being pledged as security: $ None, other than the
pledge for the within security.

G. Richard Ka&teler
6278 South Granada Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121
Tele: 801.531-0731
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

ss
)

^

th

this 12
hereof.

The foregoing instrument was ackn
day of August, 1998, by G ~Richer

before me
gner

My Commission Expires:
JOTARY I^BLIC,

Residinijji—

salt Lakft-eoMirty^BS^Socs i
r ^ ^ X
C:\WPDOCS\I\insurjte v p a r k s i d e . 7 . w p d

NICK J. COUESStDff

Salt Lake Cityv L

j

,

February 23 1 9 ^
State of U t a h ^ ^ , J

oomi

MAILING CERTIFICATE
Mailed a copy of the foregoing Renter's Counter Bond
to:
MR ROBERT L STOLEBARGER ESQ
MR GREGORY J SAVAGE ESQ
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN
111 EAST BROADWAY, SUITE 1100
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111
via the United States Postal Service, postage prepaid, first
class mail, this /^"day of August, 1998.
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Beginning on the South line of a street (Millbrook Way) at a
point South 89 deg. 49 rain West 661.41 feet and South 0 deg. 08
min West 1160.01 feet from the East Quarter corner of Section
29, Township 2 North, Range 1 East, Salt LaJce Meridian, in the
City of Bountiful, and running thence South 0 deg- 08 min. West
159.99 feet to the South line of the Northeast Quarter of the
Southeast Quarter of said Section 29; thence South 89 deg. 51
min. West 103.37 feet; thence North 0 Deg. 08 min- East 171.83
feet to said street at a point on a 325 foot radius curve to the
left; thence along said curve for an arch distance of 86.98 feet
along said street; thence East 17.45 feet to the point of
beginning
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22-21-231-009

Unit No. 8 in Block B. of MONTE CRISTO PHASE I, a Condominiurn
Project, according to the Record of Survey Map filed for record
as Entry No. 2559805 in Book 73-8 of Plats at Page 56, together
with the appurtenant undivided ownership interest in the "Common
Areas 3nd Facilities* of Monre Cristo Phase [, II, [II, *r)d IV
as set forth in the Fourth Amendment To The Declaration of
Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions of Monte Cristo, a
Condominium Project and the Final Amended Exhibit "B" attached
thereto, filed for record as Entry No. 2665379 in Book 3727 at
pages 173 through 178 of Official Records.
Said Common Areas
and Facilities being set forth and defined by the original
Declaration filed for record as Entry N o . 2559806 in Book 3389
at page 144 through 182 of Official Records, and the First,
Second, Third and Fourth Amendments thereto.
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HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN 11 p
Greggory J. Savage, #5988
Matthew N Evans, #7051
111 East Broadway, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801)521-5800

S/

.

m

Deputy

Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

PARKSIDE SALT LAKE
CORPORATION, a Delaware
corporation,
Plaintiff,

)

LIS PENDENS

]
;
I

Civil No. 980906982

i

Judge Steven L. Henriod

V.

INSURE-RITE, INC., a Utah corporation, ;
Defendant

]

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
You are hereby advised of the pendency of the above-entitled action concerning title to
certain real property situated in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, that is more particularly
described in Exhibit"A" attached hereto.
This is an unlawful detainer action. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-8.5 the
Defendant Insure-Rite Inc. filed a counterpossession property bond and filed as security for the
property bond the property described in Exhibit "A". On November 30,1998, the Court
determined that Insure-Rite had improperly withheld possession of the leased premises and has
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since awarded money damages in the amount of $108,417.24, plus interest, attorney's fees and
costs to the Plaintiff Plaintiff therefore may satisfy judgment through obtaining title to the
property described in Exhibit "A".
DATED this ^ L day of March, 1999.
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN LLP

Greggory J. Savage
Matthew N. Evans
Attorneys for Plaintiff

STATE OF UTAH

)

SALT LAKE COUNTY

:ss.
)

<*4>
day of March, 1999, by

The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this (ft

Matthew N. Evans on behalf of Holme Roberts & Owen LLP, Attorneys for Plaintiff
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Notary P u b i i c ^ " " !

BEBHA BOWMAN ,

^ l ^ 3 5 1 Broadway. Suite 1100 I

S9kUke c,t Utaf

* »wm .

^Convussion Expires

I

Myfc>qtg|p*s:6ionOfpumcs; 2003
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EXHIBILA

Sidwell No.: 22-21-231-009
Unit No. 8 in Block B, of MONTE CRISTO PHASE I, a
Condominium Project, according to the Record of Survey Map filed
for record as Entry No. 2559805 in Book 73-8 of Plats at Page 56,
together with the appurtenant undivided ownership interest in the
"Common Areas and Facilities" of Monte Cristo Phase I, II, III, and
IV as set forth in the Fourth Amendment To The Declaration of
Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions of Monte Cristo, a
Condominium Project and the Final Amended Exhibit "B" attached
thereto, filed for record as Entry No. 2665379 in Book 3727 at pages
173 through 178 of Official Records. Said Common Areas and
Facilities being set forth and defined by the original Declaration filed
for record as Entry No. 2559806 in Book 3389 at page 144 through
182 of Official Records, and the First, Second, Third and Fourth
Amendments thereto.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that 1 caused to be mailed via First Class, U.S. Mail, postage prepaid the
foregoing LIS PENDENS to the following this ffiday of March, 1999 to the following:
Nick J. Colessides
John T. Giannopoulos
466 South 400 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 -3325
John E.S. Robson
Fabian & Clendenin
215 South State, #1200
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
G. Richard Kasteler
6278 South Granada Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121

#66874

4

G0017

TabF

Date,

Time

M,

iiequesi of
Nan^y Workman. Recorder
Salt LcKe County, man

When Recorded Please Return To:

S

HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN LLP
Greggory J. Savage, #5988
Matthew N. Evans, #7051
111 East Broadway, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801)521-5800

Sy

.

Deputy

Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

PARKSIDE SALT LAKE
CORPORATION, a Delaware
corporation,
Plaintiff,

)

LIS PENDENS

]
)

Civil No. 980906982

V.

i

Judge Steven L. Henriod

INSURE-RITE, INC., a Utah corporation, }
Defendant.

]

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
You are hereby advised of the pendency of (he above-entitled action concerning title to
certain real property situated in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, that is more particularly
described in Exhibit "A" attached hereto.
This is an unlawful detainer action. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-8.5 the
Defendant Insure-Rite Inc. filed a counterpossession property bond and filed as security for the
property bond the property described in Exhibit "A". On November 30,1998, the Court
determined that Insure-Rite had improperly withheld possession of the leased premises and has
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since awarded money damages in the amount of SI 08,417.24, plus interest, attorney's fees and
costs to the Plaintiff Plaintiff therefore may satisfy judgment through obtaining title to the
property described in Exhibit "A".
DATED this yV

day of March, 1999.
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN LLP

Greggory J. Savage
Matthew N. Evans
Attorneys for Plaintiff

STATE OF UTAH

)
:ss.

SALT LAKE COUNTY

)

ifda

The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this fiT\ day of March, 1999, by
Matthew R Evans on behalf of Holme Roberts & Owenixp, Attorneys for Plaintiff.
Notary Public

~fc

DEBRA BOWMAN

,

H I East Broadway. Surte IT00
Sa» lake Crty. Utah 84111

I

Notary Public

CoiYnftfeiOTi^ffnrei
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EXHIBIT A

Beginning on the South line of a street (Millbrook Way) at a point
South 89 deg. 49 min West 661.41 feet and South 0 deg. 08 min West
1160.01 feet from the East Quarter corner of Section 29, Township 2
North, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Meridian, in the City of Bountiful,
and running thence South 0 deg. 08 min. West 159.99 feet to the
South line of the Northeast Quarter of the Southeast Quarter of said
section 29; thence South 89 deg. 51 min. West 103.37 feet; thence
North 0 deg. 08 min. East 171.83 feet to said street at a point on a 325
foot radius curve to the left; thence along said curve for an arch
distance of 86.98 feet along said street; thence East 17.45 feet to the
point of beginning
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I cenify that I caused to be mailed via First Class, U.S Mail, postage prepaid the
foregoing LIS PENDENS to the following this ffiday of March, 1999 to the following:
Nick J. Colessides
John T. Giannopoulos
466 South 400 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3325
John E.S. Robson
Fabian & Clendenin
215 South State, #1200
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Mary L. Daines
1210 East Millbrook Way
Bountiful, Utah 84010
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HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN LLP
Greggory J. Savage, #5988
Matthew N. Evans, #7051
111 East Broadway, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801)521-5800
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

)
)

PARKSIDE SALT LAKE
CORPORATION, a Delaware
corporation,
Plaintiff,
v.

PARTIAL SATISFACTION OF
JUDGMENT

;
t

1

Civil No. 980906982

I

Judge Stephen L. Henroid

INSURE-RITE, INC., a Utah corporation, ]
Defendant.

]

Plaintiff Parkside Salt Lake Corporation ("Parkside'1) acknowledges partial satisfaction of
that certain judgment in favor of Parkside, and against Insure-Rite Inc. ("Insure-Rite"),
Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff, dated and entered March 26, 1999, in the amount of
$108,417.24, and designated as Judgment No. 1. This amount constitutes damages awarded to
Parkside for the fair market rental value of the leased space unlawfully occupied by Insure-Rite
trebled pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-10. Parkside directs the clerk of the above-entitled
Court to release of record that portion of Judgment No.l that has been satisfied as acknowledged
herein.

00113

This partial satisfaction of judgment does not effect Parkside's right to collect reasonable
attorneys' fees, court costs and interest which the Court has awarded to Parkside in said
Judgment No. 1.
DATED this HfK day of June, 1999.
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN LLP

By_i_
/ : "'7/ .. :
/ Greggory'X S a v'age /
MattheW N: Evans
Attorneys for Plaintiff

J.
/
/

STATE OF UTAH
ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )

.isj/t

The foregoing instrument was SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this J£_ day
of June, 1999, by Greggory J. Savage, the signer hereof.
"Notary Public

OEBRA BOWMAN
$

#68434

I

,

;11 East Broadway, Suite 1100 I
Salt lake City. Utah 84111
My Commission Expires
|
January 18.2003
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that I caused to be mailed via First Class, U.S. Mail, postage prepaid the
foregoing PARTIAL SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENT to the following this J_ day of June,
1999 to the following:
Nick J. Colessides
John T. Giannopoulos
466 South 400 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3325
John E.S. Robson
Fabian & Clendenin
215 South State, #1200
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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Addre|

HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN LLP
Greggory J, Savage (5988)
~c~T
Matthew N. Evans (7051)
111 East Broadway, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801)521-5800
Facsimile: (801)521-9639

rof_Con_siaoie. Coiiins 461 -0234

Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

PARKSIDE SALT LAKE
CORPORATION,
Plaintiff,

INSURE-RITE, INC.,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

WRIT OF GARNISHMENT
(Non-Wage)

Civil No. 980906982
Judge Stephen L. Henroid

THE STATE OF UTAH TO: Zions First National Bank.
You are hereby ordered and commanded by the Court to hold, until further order of this
Court, and not pay to Insure-Rite, Inc. any money or other personal property in your possession
or under your control, whether now due or hereafter to become due, which are not exempt from
execution, up to the amount remaining due on the judgment or order plus court approved costs in
this matter, being not less than $33,001.56.
You are required to answer the attached Interrogatories and file your answer with the
Clerk of the Court within five (5) business days of the date this Writ is served upon you. The
#71866

00122

address of the Clerk is: The Third Judicial District Court. 450 S. State Street. Salt Lake City: I IT
8411 r. You are also required to send a copy of your Interrogatory answers to Plaintiffs' counsel
at the following address:
Greggory J. Savage
Matthew N. Evans
Holme Roberts & Owen, LLP
111 East Broadway, #1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

If you fail to answer the Interrogatories, the judgment creditor may ask the Court to make
you pay the amount you should have withheld.
If you are indebted to or hold property or money belonging to Insure-Rite, Inc. which is
subject to this Writ, you shall immediately mail by first class mail a copy of the Writ of
Garnishment and your answer to the Interrogatories, the Notice of Garnishment and Exemptions
and two (2) copies of the Request for Hearing to Insure-Rite, Inc. at their last known address
shown on your records at the time of the service of this Writ. In lieu of mailings, you may handdeliver a copy of these documents to Insure-Rite, Inc.
YOU MAY DELIVER to the officer serving this Writ the portion of Insure-Rite, Inc.'s
property or money to be held as shown by your answers. You will then be relieved from further
liability in this case unless your answers are successfully disputed. You may, in the alternative,
hold the money or property until further order of the Court.

#71866
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If you do not receive an order from the Court regarding this Writ and the property you
held pursuant to this Writ within sixty (6'0) days after filing your answers to the attached
interrogatories, this Writ shall expire and you may ignore it.
DATED this

<Zd) day of July, 1999.
CLERK OF THE COURT

acou
By:_
DEPUTY CLERK

••••-•.
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CONSTABLE SUSAN COLLINS
1492 South State Street, S.L. C. UT 84111
461-0234
RETURN OF SERVICE
(GARNISHMENT/GARNISHEE ORDER)
PARKSIDE SALT LAKE CORP Plaintiff )
v
)
INSURE-RITE, INC
Defendant )

CASE #: 980906982

I HEREBY MAKE RETURN OF SERVICE AND CERTIFY:
1)

I am a duly qualified and acting peace officer in Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, or am a person over the age of 18 at the time of this
service, and not a party to this action.

2)

I received this GARNISHMENT, INTERR, $10.00
on the date of 07/30/99 and served same upon the Garnishee listed
below by leaving, at the address(s) and on the date(s) shown below,
a copy with the Garnishee, Garnishee's agent for service or payroll
officer of the Garnishee, to whom I also showed the original.

3)

Upon serving the same, I endorsed the date and place of service and m^
name on the copy served.
Garnishee: ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK
I Served: ALLISON ROBISON, GARNISHE
On the date of: 07-30-99
Time: 14:40
At the address of: 10 E SOUTH TEMPLE ST, SLC UT 841 ,

Service:
Mileage:
Other:
Copies:
Total:

6.00
1.00

Constable Susan Collins

7.00
Deputy TODD ORAM

# of Trips:
Total Miles:

SL59D

1
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HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN LLP
Greggory J Savage (5988)
Matthew N Evans (7051)
111 East Bioadway, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone. (801)521-5800
Facsimile: (801)521-9639

y- ? y^y^ -

Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

PARKSIDE SALT LAKE
CORPORATION,

"I
]1

Plaintiff,

;

Defendant.

)
i
"
i
'

v.
INSURE-RITE, INC.,

WRIT OF GARNISHMENT
(Non-Wage)

Civil No. 980906982
Judge Stephen L. Henroid

THE STATE OF UTAH TO: Zions First National Bank.
You are hereby ordered and commanded by the Court to hold, until further order of this
Court, and not pay to Insure-Rite, Inc. any money or other personal property in your possession
or under your control, whether now due or hereafter to become due, which are not exempt from
execution, up to the amount remaining due on the judgment or order plus court approved costs in
this matter, being not less than $14,500.00.
You are required to answer the attached Interrogatories and file your answer with the
Clerk of the Court within five (5) business days of the date this Writ is served upon you. The
#70801

00127

address of the Clerk is: The Third Judicial District Court, 450 S. State Street, Salt Lake City, UT
MULL You are also required to send a copy of your Interrogatory answers to Plaintiffs' counsel
at the following address:
Greggory J. Savage
Matthew N. Evans
Holme Roberts & Owen, LLP
111 East Broadway, #1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

If you fail to answer the Interrogatories, the judgment creditor may ask the Court to make
you pay the amount you should have withheld.
If you are indebted to or hold property or money belonging to Insure-Rite, Inc. which is
subject to this Writ, you shall immediately mail by first class mail a copy of the Writ of
Garnishment and your answer to the Interrogatories, the Notice of Garnishment and Exemptions
and two (2) copies of the Request for Hearing to Insure-Rite, Inc. at their last known address
shown on your records at the time of the service of this Writ. In lieu of mailings, you may handdeliver a copy of these documents to Insure-Rite, Inc.
YOU MAY DELIVER to the officer serving this Writ the portion of Insure-Rite, Inc/s
property or money to be held as shown by your answers. You will then be relieved from further
liability in this case unless your answers are successfully disputed. You may, in the alternative,
hold the money or property until further order of the Court.

#70801
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If you do not leceive an oidei fiom the Court tegarding this Win and the piopcrty \ou
held pursuant to this Writ within sixty (60) days after filing your answers to the attached
intenogatories, this Wat shall expire and you may ignoie it
DATED this ^fJ

day of June, 1999.
CLERK OF THiySQLQJJ

^EFtJWjgfcERK .'
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CONSTABLE SUSAN COLLINS
1492 South State Street, S.L. C. UT 84111
461-0234
RETURN OF SERVICE
(GARNISHMENT/GARNISHEE ORDER)
PARKSIDE SALT LAKE CORP Plaintiff )
v
)
INSURE-RITE, INC
Defendant )

CASE #: 980906982

I HEREBY MAKE RETURN OF SERVICE AND CERTIFY:
1)

I am a duly qualified and acting peace officer in Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, or am a person over the age of 18 at the time of this
service, and not a party to this action.

2)

I received this GARNISHMENT, INTERR, $10.00
on the date of 06/30/99 and served same upon the Garnishee listed
below by leaving, at the address(s) and on the date(s) shown below,
a copy with the Garnishee, Garnishee's agent for service or payroll
officer of the Garnishee, to whom I also showed the original.

3)

Upon serving the same, I endorsed the date and place of service and m
name on the copy served.
Garnishee: ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK
I Served: JULIE MEADOWS, GARNISHEE
On the date of: 06-30-99
Time: 16:45
At the address of: 10 E SOUTH TEMPLE ST #500, SLC U ,

Service:
Mileage:
Other:
Copies:
Total:

6.00
1.00
7.00

Constable Susan Collins

:

^C*£ ^J &**"—-

Deputy TODD ORAM
# of Trips:
Total Miles:

SL59D

1
1
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HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN LLP
Greggory J. Savage,. #5988
Matthew N.Evans, #7051
111 East Broadway, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 521-5800
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
PARKSIDE SALT LAKE
CORPORATION, a Delaware
corporation,

RELEASE OF LIS PENDENS

Plaintiff,
Civil No. 980906982
Judge Stephen L. Henriod
INSURE-RITE, INC., a Utah corporation,
Defendant.

On or about March 29,1999, plaintiff Parkside Salt Lake Corporation filed a lis pendens,
recorded as Entry No. 7304439 in Book 8262, Page 7913 of the official records of Salt Lake
County, State of Utah. Plaintiff Parkside Salt Lake Corporation, by and through its counsel,
hereby releases the lis pendens insofar as it affects the property described in Exhibit "A" attached
hereto.

GO
CO
CD
00
CO
CD

#73400 vl

DATED this f d - day of September, 1999.
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN LLP

'Greggory J./^avage'
;
Matthejv N. Evans
Attorneys for Plaintiff

STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY

)
:s
:ss.

)

The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this '

r^

day of September, 1999,

by Greggory J. Savage on behalf of Holme Roberts & Owen LLP, counsel for Plaintiff Parkside
Salt Lake Corporation.
r°

(

M^in JO ems
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Notary Public
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that I caused to be mailed via First Class, U.S. Mail, postage prepaid the
foregoing RELEASE OF LIS PENDENS to the following this J_ day of September, 1999 to
the following:
Nick J. Colessides
466 South 400 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3325
John E.S. Robson
Fabian & Clendenin
215 South State, #1200
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Mary L. Daines
1210 East Millbrook Way
Bountiful, Utah 84010

9*1 <*W
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CD
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-4
CO
CD
CD
#73400 vl

EXHIBIT A

Beginning on the South line of a street (Millbrook Way) at a point South 89 deg.
49 min West 661.41 feet and South 0 deg. 08 min West 1160.01 feet from the
East Quarter corner of Section 29, Township 2 North, Range 1 East, Salt Lake
Meridian, in the City of Bountiful, and running thence South 0 deg. 08 min. West
159.99 feet to the South line of the Northeast Quarter of the Southeast Quarter of
said section 29; thence South 89 deg. 51 min. West 103.37 feet; thence North 0
deg. 08 min. East 171.83 feet to said street at a point on a 325 foot radius curve to
the left; thence along said curve for an arch distance of 86.98 feet along said
street; thence East 17.45 feet to the point of beginning

OO
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HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN LLP
Greggory J. Savage, #5988
Matthew N. Evans, #7051
111 East Broadway, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 521-5800
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

PARKSIDE SALT LAKE
CORPORATION, a Delaware
corporation,

RELEASE OF LIS PENDENS

Plaintiff,
Civil No. 980906982
Judge Stephen L. Henriod
INSURE-RITE, INC., a Utah corporation,
Defendant.

On or about March 29,1999, plaintiff Parkside Salt Lake Corporation filed a lis pendens,
recorded as Entry No. 7304440 in Book 8262, Page 7917 of the official records of Salt Lake
County, State of Utah. Plaintiff Parkside Salt Lake Corporation, by and through its counsel,
hereby releases the lis pendens insofar as it affects the property described in Exhibit "A"
attached hereto.

•5C

CO
CO
CD
CD

-J

CO
CD
CD.
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DATED this Jgt. day of September, 1999.
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN LLP

Bv

.--—•/1

r /^

.. M

L

Greggbry/f. Savage /
VISK:Evans
Matthev/M
Attorneys for Plaintiff

STATE OF UTAH

)
:ss.
:s

SALT LAKE COUNTY

)
i^

The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this /

day of September, 1999,

by Greggory J. Savage on behalf of Holme Roberts & Owen LLP, Attorneys for Plaintiff Parkside
Salt Lake Corporation.
Notary Public

*A
Vol
fej

DEBRA BOWMAN

"1 :

.'11 East Broadway, Sun© 1100 I
Sah Lake Crty, Utah 64111
.
My Commission Exp^es
§
January 18,2003

SUte. of Utah

'A^-^

.

Notary Public

j

w* wm . w •** *** *** &<*

CO
CO
CD
CO
CO
CD
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that I caused to be mailed via First Class, U.S. Mail, postage prepaid the
foregoing RELEASE OF LIS PENDENS to the following this [_ day of September, 1999 to
the following:
Nick J. Colessides
466 South 400 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3325
John E.S. Robson
Fabian & Clendenin
215 South State, #1200
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
G. Richard Kasteler
6278 South Granada Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121

W^^

CO'
CO
CD
CO
—o

CO
O
#73401 vl

EXHIBIT A

Sidwell No.: 22-21-231-009
Unit No. 8 in Block B, of MONTE CRISTO PHASE I, a Condominium Project,
according to the Record of Survey Map filed for record as Entry No. 2559805 in
Book 73-8 of Plats at Page 56, together with the appurtenant undivided ownership
interest in the "Common Areas and Facilities" of Monte Cristo Phase I, II, III, and
IV as set forth in the Fourth Amendment To The Declaration of Covenants,
Conditions and Restrictions of Monte Cristo, a Condominium Project and the
Final Amended Exhibit "B" attached thereto, filed for record as Entry No.
2665379 in Book 3727 at pages 173 through 178 of Official Records. Said
Common Areas and Facilities being set forth and defined by the original
Declaration filed for record as Entry No. 2559806 in Book 3389 at page 144
through 182 of Official Records, and the First, Second, Third and Fourth
Amendments thereto.
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NOTICE:
OPINION.

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED

(The Court's decision is referenced in a
"Table of Decisions Without Reported
Opinions" appearing in the Federal Reporter.
Use FI CTA10 Rule 36.3 for rules regarding
the publication and citation of unpublished
opinions.)
J. Walter FITZGERALD, Betty M.
Fitzgerald, Printess K. Fitzgerald,
Jenence
Fitzgerald, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
UTAH COUNTY, Jeril Wilson, Lynn W.
Davis, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 88-2384.
United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
April 29,1991.
D. Utah, No. C-83-0736W.
D.Utah
AFFIRMED.
Before SEYMOUR and BALDOCK, Circuit
Judges, and THEIS, District Judge. [FN*]
ORDER AND JUDGMENT [FN**]
SEYMOUR, Circuit Judge.
**1 J. Walter Fitzgerald, Betty M. Fitzgerald,
Printess K. Fitzgerald, and Jenence Fitzgerald
(the Fitzgeralds) brought this action pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) and state law
against Utah County and its employees and
agents asserting claims arising out of
enforcement
of the
County's
zoning
ordinances. The critical facts underlying the
action are the Fitzgeralds' failure to obtain a
waiver under a County regulation of otherwise
applicable zoning requirements, and the
publicizing of their noncompliance with those
ordinances. The Fitzgeralds sold or attempted

to sell land zoned for agricultural use to
buyers who believed that they would
ultimately be able to use the property for
residential purposes. The Fitzgeralds alleged
that when the County refused to approve the
waiver and publicized the Fitzgeralds' failure
to comply with the zoning regulations, buyers
who had already entered into purchase
contracts stopped paying on those contracts
and potential sales were lost.
The Fitzgeralds challenged the validity of the
Utah County ordinances on several grounds.
In addition, they contended that the zoning
regulations constituted a taking of their
property in violation of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments, claimed
that
defendants' alleged defamatory statements
deprived them of their property interests in
either their realty or realty contracts without
due process, and asserted a state law claim for
slander of title based on the filing of a lis
pendens. Defendants moved for summary
judgment. The district court referred the
matter to a magistrate, who issued a report
recommending that summary judgment be
granted to all defendants except Utah County,
deputy County attorney Lynn Davis, and Utah
County Commissioner Jeril Wilson.
The
report recommended that only two of
plaintiffs' claims be allowed to go forward:
the
defamatory-injury-to-property
claim
against all three remaining defendants, and
the slander-of-title claim against defendants
Utah County and Lynn Davis. The district
court accepted the report except for the
recommendation relating to the slander-oftitle claim.
The court rejected the
recommendation that this claim remain in the
suit, concluding instead that it was barred by
the applicable statute of limitations. The
district court held two evidentiary hearings on
the remaining defamatory-injury-to-property
claim, and then granted defendants' motion to
dismiss.
The Fitzgeralds appeal and we
affirm.
I.
Under

Utah

County
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promulgated pursuant to state zoning statutes,
a subdivision plan or plat cannot be recorded
until approved by the county planning
commission, and no land located within a
subdivision can be sold until the plat has been
recorded. See Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-21
(1987 replacement); Utah County Ordinance
4-3-52 (Addendum to Brief of Appellants, doc.
B). Under state law, a subdivision is defined
as "the division of a tract, or lot or parcel of
land into three or more lots, plats, sites or
other divisions of land for the purpose ... of
sale or of building development." Utah Code
Ann. § 17-27-27. This definition specifically
excludes "a bona fide division or partition of
agricultural land for agricultural purposes."
Id. Thus, unlike a tract of land that is divided
and sold for residential purposes, the division
of an agricultural tract need not be approved
and recorded prior to sale. In conjunction with
the above regulations, Utah County enacted
the zoning ordinance at issue, under which a
property owner who wants to divide and sell
agricultural land without recording a plat
must obtain a waiver from the County
Building Inspector. The waiver requires the
recordation of deed covenants precluding
residential or other non-agricultural use of the
land. See Utah County Ordinance § 4-3-53
(Addendum to Brief of Appellants, doc. B).
**2 The Fitzgeralds divided and sold
agricultural land without recording the plat.
They assert on appeal that these divisions
were to be used as small farmsteads, and
therefore recording the plat was unnecessary.
However, they also failed to obtain the
required waivers because apparently not all
the purchasers were willing to execute
covenants precluding residential use. The
record reflects that at least some of the
purchasers expected that the land would be
rezoned to permit residential use in the future.
The Fitzgeralds first assert that the
ordinances are invalid and void, and
administered unconstitutionally.
We have
carefully
reviewed
the
analysis
and
authorities addressing these claims in the
magistrate's report, which the district court
adopted. We are in substantial agreement
with the disposition of these issues as set out
Copr. © West 1999 No Claim
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therein.
The Fitzgeralds also contend that the
ordinances constitute a taking of their
property without just compensation in
violation of the Fifth Amendment. The law is
clear that such a claim is not ripe until all
administrative avenues for review of the
unfavorable zoning decision have been
exhausted and state procedures for obtaining
just compensation have been utilized. See
Williamson Co. Regional Planning Comm'n v.
Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 186-87 (1985);
Landmark Land Co. of Oklahoma, Inc. v.
Buchanan, 874 F.2d 717, 721 (10th Cir.1989).
Here, state law provides an appeal to the
board of adjustment for persons aggrieved by a
decision made in the course of administering
or enforcing zoning regulations. See Utah
Code Ann. § 17-27-16. The Fitzgeralds have
not pursued their claims with the board of
adjustment, nor have they demonstrated that
an appeal would be futile or that the decision
at issue is otherwise final. Moreoever, and of
equal significance, the Fitzgeralds have not
established that they pursued state procedures
for obtaining just compensation. Accordingly,
their taking claim is premature.

a
The Fitzgeralds also appeal the district
court's dismissal of their claim alleging that
defendants deprived them of their property
interest without due process by issuing
defamatory statements. The district court
held two hearings to enable the Fitzgeralds to
present evidence on this claim to raise a fact
issue in opposition to defendants' motion for
summary judgment. At the second hearing,
plaintiffs proffered evidence describing the
testimony that would be presented at trial by
people who bought land from plaintiffs
believing that the land would be rezoned for
residential use.
These buyers allegedly
stopped paying on their contracts when they
learned that the land would not be rezoned.
We agree with the district court that this
evidence, taken as true, does not support a
constitutional claim. The Due Process Clause
mandates the procedures necessary to provide
Orig. U.S. Govt. Works

931 F.2d 900 (Table)
(Cite as: 931 F.2d 900, 1991 WL 70672, **2 (10th Cir.(Utah)))
defamed persons an opportunity to clear their
names by allowing them to establish that the
defamatory statements are false. See Codd v.
Velger, 429 U.S. 624, 627 (1977) (per curiam).
Thus, only when "a false and defamatory
impression" is created and disseminated is a
hearing mandated. Id. at 628; Melton v. City
of Oklahoma City, - F.2d , - - , No. 85-1758,
slip op. at 19-21 (10th Cir. March 19, 1991) (en
banc). Assuming that a defamatory injury to
property without due process could under some
circumstances state a claim for relief under
section 1983, plaintiffs have failed to establish
an essential element of such a claim.
Plaintiffs' proffered evidence, viewed most
favorably to them, showed that the buyers
who stopped paying on their contracts did so
because defendants' statements led them to
believe that their property could never legally
be used for residential purposes. As the
district court observed, the statements to this
effect attributed to defendants were not
defamatory because they were true.
**3 Plaintiffs asserted below and on appeal
that the defamatory statements included
allegations that their land sales were illegal,
which they vehemently deny. Plaintiffs' own
proffered evidence, however, shows that their
damages were not caused by the charges of
illegal sales.
Instead, their buyers were
influenced to stop payment on their contracts
by statements that residential use of the land
would never be allowed. Moreover, as set out
in Part I, supra, it appears from the record
that plaintiffs' sales were in fact illegal. It is
undisputed that plaintiffs did not obtain the
waiver from the County Building Inspector
required to subdivide and sell agricultural
land without recording a plat, nor did they
record their plat.
"Any sale or other transfer of land into three
or more parcels without the owner or agent of
the owner first having obtained a signed
waiver from the Building Inspector, or having
recorded an approved subdivision plat, shall
be considered prima facie evidence of the
illegal subdivision of land and a violation of
this section and Section 4-3-52 of this
ordinance, subject to the penalties stated
therein."
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Utah County Ordinance § 4-3-53 (Addendum
to Brief of Appellants, doc. B). Section 4-3-52
provides that one who sells property within an
unrecorded and unapproved subdivision is
guilty of a misdemeanor and subject to civil
remedies. See Utah County Ordinance § 4-352 (Addendum to Brief of Appellants, doc. B).
Accordingly, we affirm the district court's
disposition of plaintiffs' claim for defamatory
injury to property without due process. We do
not address the state law claims asserting
interference
with contractual
relations
because they are raised for the first time on
appeal.

m.
Finally, we affirm the dismissal of the
Fitzgeralds' slander-of-title claim, albeit on
grounds different from those relied on by the
district court. This state law cause of action
was based on a lis pendens covering the
property at issue recorded in connection with
the filing of a lawsuit by Utah County. The
lawsuit challenged unrecorded land sales
similar to the sales made by the Fitzgeralds,
although they were not named defendants in
that suit.
This claim fails on two equally dispositive
grounds. First, Utah holds that the recording
of a lis pendens is privileged and therefore
cannot support a claim for slander of title. See
Hansen v. Kohler, 550 P.2d 186, 189-90 (Utah
1976).
"[S]ince the effect of a lis pendens is to give
constructive notice of all the facts apparent on
the face of the pleadings, the recordation of a
notice of lis pendens is, in effect, a
republication of the pleadings. Since the
publication of the pleadings is absolutely
privileged, the republication thereof by
recording a notice of lis pendens is similarly
privileged."
Id. at 190. The instant case is distinguishable
from Birch v. Fuller, 9 Utah 2d 79, 337 P.2d
964 (1959), upon which the Fitzgeralds rely,
because in Birch no underlying action was
filed. Here, as in Hansen, an underlying
lawsuit was filed. Although plaintiffs argue
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that Hansen is not controlling because they
were not named in the suit, we conclude that
this fact is not significant. The decision in
Hansen was based on the Court's holding that
a lis pendens is privileged because it merely
republishes the pleadings, which are
themselves privileged. The lis pendens here
thus derives its privilege from the action it
republishes. In Birch, to the contrary, the lis
pendens did not republish an underlying
privileged pleading.
**4 In addition, under Utah law, a slander of
title action requires proof of special damages
"by evidence of a lost sale or the loss of some
other pecuniary advantage." Bass v. Planned
Management Serv., 761 P.2d 566, 568 (Utah
1988). Damages may not be presumed. Id.
The Fitzgeralds have proffered no evidence of
the requisite specific monetary loss due to the
filing of the lis pendens. Accordingly, we
affirm the ruling against the Fitzgeralds on
this cause of action.
AFFIRMED.
FN* Honorable Frank G. Theis, United States
Senior District Judge for the District of Kansas,
sitting by designation.
FN** This order and judgment has no precedential
value and shall not be cited, or used by any court
within the Tenth Circuit, except for purposes of
establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, res
judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir.R. 36.3.
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